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"I1 pourmit au contraire sembler ci quelques uns qu'e'tant 
donnie cette compleziti des phe'nomtnes iconomiques, 
l'iconomie mathe'matique est justement beaucoup trop sim- 
ple. Ceuz-la n'aumient qu'ir se mppeler que les premitres 
propositions de la ge'omitn'e sont, elles aussi, trts simples, 
sans que cette simpliciti interdise en rien les complications 
ultirieures. 
Enfin, si quelques uns, tout en reconnaissant que la me'th- 
ode mathe'matique n'est pas superflue pour constituer la sci- 
ence de l'iconomie publique, et tout en reconnaissant sans 
doute que cette science n'atteint pas toute la compleziti du 
riel vivant, mais que ces risultats cependant sont toujours 
sous-jacents, pour ainsi dire, d ce riel, se de'fiaient de cette 
science elle-mtme, et de son importance, et cmignaient qu'on 
ne s'y enfermcit un peu complaisamment, ceuz-la n'aumient 
pas ite' frappe's des admimbles paroles, et dicisives, ori le sa- 
vant fait lui-mime la part de la science : "la rCforme sociale 
doit proceder B la fois du sentiment socialiste et de la science 
Cconomiquen . 
Charles PCguy 
un iconomiste socialiste : Lion Walrus 
La Revue Socialiste, 1897, 146, 174-186 
uFinally, let us note a point at which the theory of social 
phenomena will presumably take a very definite turn away 
from the ezisting patterns of mathematical physics. This is, 
of course, only a surmise on a subject where much uncer- 
tainty and obscurity prevail ... A dynamic theory, when one 
is found, will probably describe the changes in terms of sim- 
pler concepts*. 
John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, (1944). 
Foreword 
We shall devote these papers to  the simplest economic problem we can 
think of: 
how to allocate scarce resources among consumers 
by complying t o  the basic economic constraint 
It is impossible to consume more physical goods than available 
In other words, let us introduce the set of allocations of these scarce re- 
sources among the consumers. This means that each consumer receives a 
commodity the sum of which is viable in the sense that the total consump- 
tions is an available resource. 
This problem looks at first glance somewhat silly and simple minded, 
since it amounts t o  pick up an element in this allocation set (i.e., to  choose 
an allocation) in the case of static models, or t o  evolve in this set, regarded 
as a viability set, in the case of dynamical systems. However, it elucidates 
the basic difficulties characteristic of economic theory. 
Static models assign one or several elements in the allocation set. But 
it may be time to  answer the wish J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern 
expressed in 1944 a t  the end of the first chapter of their monograph "Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviorn: 
"Our theory is thoroughly static. A dynamic theory would unquestionably 
be more complete and therefore, preferable. But there is ample evidence from 
other branches of science that it is futile to try to build one as long as the 
static side is not thoroughly understood". 
We study here some mechanisms which govern the evolution of alloca- 
tions of scarce resources1. 
In these dynamical models, the laws which govern the evolution of allo- 
cations are most often represented by differential equations (or differential 
inclusions) with or without memory. 
Static models are particular cases of (time-independent) dynamical mod- 
els yielding "constant evolutionsn, which are also called uequilibrian. By the 
way, the concept of equilibrium often covers two different meanings in eco- 
nomics. The first one, the meaning we use in these lectures, is derived from 
'By the way, in dynamical models, we can assume that the subset of allocations evolves 
with time, depends upon the history of the evolution. 
mechanics, where an equilibrium is a constant function, or a "rest pointn. 
The second meaning is covered here by what we call the viability constraints, 
such as the total consumption must be less than or equal to the total supply, 
etc. 
0 The Issues 
0.1 The Main Issue: Decentralization 
We begin by distinguishing between centralized and decentralized models. In 
the first category of models, consumers delegate their decision power to 
another "agentn who, knowing the behaviors of the consumers and the set 
of scarce resources, solves the problem at the global level. 
For instance, consumers must agree to describe their behavior by a col- 
lective utility function 
x := (xi, .  . . ,xn) t--, U(x) = U(xl,. . . ,xn)  E R 
Then, this agent (planning bureau, big computers or big brothers, ...) 
knowing U and the subset M, decides to maximize U over the allocation set 
K. The problem is then transferred to  the question of  choosing the collective 
utility function U. 
Or, in the dynamical version, they agree to represent their behavior by, 
say, a system of differential equations 
where the variations of the consumption of each agent depend upon the 
knowledge of both the whole set of scarce resources and the choices of every 
other agents. 
In a decentralized mechanism, the information on the problem is split and 
mediated by, say, a "messagen which summarizes part of the information. In 
our case, we use for message the "price" p. Knowing the price p, consumers 
are supposed to know how to choose their consumption bundle, without 
knowing the behavior of their fellow consumers 
knowing the set of scarce resources 
Then the problem is to find what is the message which carries the relevant 
information. 
Actually, we have to ask whether it is possible to find such a relevant 
message and then, how to find it. If it is possible to answer the first type 
of question, it is much more difficult to investigate the second, leaving such 
problems to mythical players such as the "market", Adam Smith's "invisible 
handn, etc. We shall bethink that these players are not really operating on 
the price system, which we shall propose to regard as a regulatory control 
(a "regulee") to help the consumers to respect the scarcity constraints by 
delivering them proper informations on the behavior of all consumers and 
the set of available resources. 
0.2 Adam Smith's Invisible Hand 
Indeed, there is no doubt that Adam Smith is at the origin of what we now 
call decentralization, i.e., the ability for a complex system moved by different 
actions in pursuit of different objectives to achieve an allocation of scarce 
resources. The difficulty to grasp such a disordered way of regulation of 
economic processes, contrary to apparently more logical (or simple minded?) 
attractive organizational processes based on several varieties of planning 
procedures2 led him to express it in a poetic manner. Let us quote the 
celebrated citation of the WEALTH OF NATIONS published in 1796, two 
centuries ago: 
"Every individual endeavours to employ his capital so that its p d u c e  
may be of greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his own 
security, only his own gain. And he is in this led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own 
interest, he frequently thus promotes that of society more eflectually that 
when he really intends to promote it" 
However, Adam Smith did not provide a careful statement of what the 
invisible hand "manipulates" nor, a fortiori, for its existence. 
We had to wait a century more for LCon Walras, a former engineer, to  
recognize that this invisible hand "operates" on economic agents through 
prices, gaining enough information on the desires of the agents and the 
available commodities for guaranteeing their consistency, or the viability of 
the allocation system. 
He presented in 1874 the general equilibrium concept in E L ~ M E N T S  
D ' ~ C O N O M I E  POLITIQUE P U R E  as a solution to a system of nonlinear equa- 
tions. At that time, when only linear systems were understood, the fact that 
the number of equations was equal to the number of unknowns led him and 
his immediate followers to make the optimistic assumption that a solution 
should necessary exist3. 
2in favor among military organizational schemes. 
3 B ~ t  it took another century, until 1954, for Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu to 
find a mathematical solution to this problem. This solution, however, could not have been 
obtained without the fundamental Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem in 1910, which in turn 
0.3 Walras' Choice 
In modern terms, the behavior of each consumer is described by a demand 
function d; allowing the consumer to choose a commodity zi = di(p) knowing 
only the price p. The problem is then to find a price jj (the Walrasian 
equilibrium price) such that (dl@), . . . , dn(jj)) forms an allocation. This is 
a decentralized model because consumers do not need to  know neither the 
choices of other consumers nor the set M of available commodities. The 
basic Arrow-Debreu Theorem states in this case that such an equilibrium 
exists whenever a budgetary rule known as Walras law - it is forbidden to 
spend more monetary units than earned - is obeyed by consumer's demand 
functions. 
F'urthermore, such a price p is an equilibrium of an underlying dynamical 
process, called the Walrasian t3tonnement4: in its continuous version, it is 
defined by the differential inclusion 
where E is the excess demand map given by 
Hence, according to this law of supply and demand, the price increases 
whenever the excess demand is positive and decreases in the opposite case. 
We observe that if p(t) is a price supplied by the Walras titonnement 
process and if it is not an equilibrium, it cannot be implemented because the 
associated demand is not necessarily available. 
Hence, this model forbids consumers to transact as long as the prices are not 
equilibria. It is as if there was a super auctioneer calling prices and receiving 
offers from consumers. If the offers do not match, he calls another price 
according to the above dynamical process, but does not allow transactions to 
take place as long as the offers are not consistent, and this happens only at 
equilibria!. 
TOtonnement is therefore not viable. 
required much modification to tailor it to this specific problem - by proving theorems 
whose assumptions could bear the same degree of economic interpretation as the conclusion. 
'Titonnement means 'tentative processn, =trial and errorn - literally, cumbersomely 
walking in obscurity by touch (titer). 
And it may be too much to ask the entity which regulates the price (the 
market, the invisible hand, the Gosplan, ...) to behave as a real decision- 
maker. 
The concept of economic equilibrium and titonnement that we owe to 
LQn Walras is not his only claim to our gratitude: L b n  Walras was one of 
the first persons (after Condorcet, Boda, Cournot, Canard, and few other) 
to suggest that mathematics could be useful in economic theory. Original- 
ity is often more a question of finding a new way of looking at the world 
than of making discoveries that attract the attention of one's peers. Walras 
introduced mathematical rigor into a domain which had never before been 
subjected to detailed analysis. He did it with disregard for - even in opposi- 
tion to  - the prevailing economic thinking of the times, despite tremendous 
difficulties, alone and without help, without the encouragement and moral 
support of his colleagues. He did it because, deep within him, he realized 
the far-reaching consequences of his bold vision. 
However, the legitimate admiration that he deserves should not imply a 
dogmatic respect of his contribution by his followers: the equilibrium con- 
cept was a simplifying step in the attempt to grasp some essential economic 
feature in an otherwise complex maze of concepts. This concept had its 
use, as a first approximation, despite the fact that it rarely happened in 
economic history. So, its dipassement, as well as the observation that the 
Walrasian titonnement is not viable and should be replaced by a viable 
dynamical system, should not be regarded by the faithfuls as a crime of 
lise majesti. On the other hand, smart - but superficial - minds should 
not use these shortcomings to claim that any decentralized mechanism us- 
ing prices is merely a fantasy dreamed by mathematicians from their ivory 
towers - an empty box, as it has been written - and even, to reject the rel- 
evance of mathematical metaphors in economics. This is a typical instance 
of impatience and the totalitarian desire for monist explanations. 
0.4 The Visible Consumers 
It may be wise indeed to let the real decision-makers, the consumers in our 
case, to govern the evolution of their consumption through differential equa- 
tions 
zl(t) = ci(zi(t), ~ ( t ) )  
parametrized (or controlled) by the price p(t), so that consumers change 
their consumptions knowing only the pricep(t) at  each time t, without taking 
into account neither the behavior of the other consumers nor the knowledge of 
the set M of scarce resources. Hence it shares with the Walras static model 
its decentralization property. 
The problem is then to  find a price function p(t) such that the associated 
solutions zi(t) of the above differential equations do form an allocation at each 
time t. We prove that this viability property holds true under a dynamical 
version of the Walras law and even prove the existence of an equilibrium of 
this dynarnical model. 
Actually, we would like t o  know more than a time-dependent price func- 
tion (which can be regarded as an open loop control). We wish t o  obtain 
"feedback prices", or, more generally, set-valued "regulation maps" associ- 
ating with each allocation z E K one price, or more generally, the set II(z) 
of relevant messages, so that the evolution law of the relevant message is 
0.5 Selection Mechanisms 
The set of viable prices (regarded as relevant messages) may contain more 
than one element. The question arises t o  select one of these prices, or, t o  
shrink the set of viable prices by an adequate mechanism. This can be 
done by optimization techniques, or, more generally, by game theoretical 
methods. 
In the dynamical case, this question splits in two: we have t o  distinguish 
between "intertemporal optimizationn problems and "myopic or instanta- 
neous optimization" problems. 
In intertemporal optimization, we maximize intertemporal utility func- 
tions of the form 
under the constraint (z(.), p(-)) E Graph(II). 
These are questions with which Calculus of Variations and Optimal Con- 
trol Theory deal with. 
But Optimal Control Theory does require the Market or Adam Smith's 
invisible hand t o  "guide" the system by optimizing such an intertemporal 
optimality criterion, the choice of which is open to  question even in static 
models, even when multicriteria or several decision makers are involved in 
the model. 
Furthermore, the choice (even conditional) of the controls is made once 
and for all a t  some initial time, so that they cannot be modified at each 
instant so as t o  take into account possible modifications of  the environment o f  
the system, forbidding therefore adaptation to scarcity constraints. 
Finally, intertemporal optimization theory does require the knowledge of 
the future (even of a stochastic nature.) This requires the possibility of 
experimentation or the belief that the phenomenon under study is periodic. 
Experimentation, by assuming that the evolution of the state of the system 
starting from a given initial state for a same period of time will be the same 
whatever the initial time, allows one to  translate the time interval back and 
forth, and, thus, t o  "known the future evolution of the system. 
But in economics, as well as in biological evolution, experimentation is 
not possible5. Furthermore, the dynamics o f  the system disappear and cannot 
be recreated. Most economic systems do involve myopic behavior; while they 
cannot take into account the future, they are certainly constrained by the 
past. Hence, forecasting or prediction of the future are not the issues which 
we shall address here. La pre'vision e s t  u n  r2ve duquel l'e've'nement n o u s  tire, 
wrote Paul Valdry. 
We shall instead attempt to  understand how the evolution of economic 
systems is governed. 
Therefore, instead of using intertemporal optimization6 that involves 
the future, we shall propose to use Viability Theory for providing selection 
procedures of viable evolutions obeying, at each instant, scarcity or more 
generally, viability constraints which depend upon the present or the past. 
(This does not exclude anticipations, which are extrapolations of past evo- 
lutions, constraining in the last analysis the evolution of the system to be a 
function of its history.) 
However, the use of optimal control theory led to  the popular theory of 
rational expectations. It shares with general equilibrium theory the feature of 
growing up from available mathematical theories and being transferred to  
economics. The pretty large consensus around these concepts make them 
"realn according to  the following definition of the degree o f  reality for a social 
group at a given time: Reality is the consensus interpretations of  the group 
member's perceptions of  their physical, biological, social and cultural environ- 
ments. 
- 
'The twentieth century Soviet type (or military type) economic experimentation 
showed experimentally the limits of centralized operation of complex systems. 
'which can be traced back to Sumerian mythology which is at the origin of Genesis: 
one Decision-Maker, deciding what is good and bad and choosing the best (fortunately, on 
an intertemporal basis, thus wisely postponing to eternity the verification of optimality), 
knowing the future, and having taken the optimal decisions, well, during one week ... 
But it should be time for this consensus t o  evolve by looking for economic 
facts to  motivate new mathematical theories and not the other way around. 
In myopic optimization, we use the feedback relation and we select for 
each allocation z E K a price p E II(z) by a static optimization technique 
(or any other kind of technique). For instance, we can choose the element 
xO(z) E II(z) of minimal norm. Despite the lack of continuity of such a 
selection, we still can prove that the system of differential equations 
has viable solutions, which are called "slow allocationsn. 
However, this type of selection may not enjoy economic meaning. We 
propose another one which may be closer in spirits to  economic mechanisms. 
0.6 The Inertia Principle 
Actually, if the behavior of the consumers is well defined, what about either 
the market or ' the planning bureau, the task of which is to  find the prices 
p(t) in II(z(t))? They do not behave as actual decision makers, knowing 
what is good or not (this is the case of even a planning bureau as soon as it 
involves more than three bureaucrats!). Hence, their role is only a regulatory 
one. If they are not able t o  optimize, we may assume that  they only are able 
to  correct the prices when the viability of the economic system is a t  stake, 
i.e., when the total consumption is no longer available. 
Hence, we assume that  the market (Adam Smith's "invisible handn) or 
the planning bureau are able t o  "pilotn or "actn on the system by choosing 
such controls according t o  the inertia principle: 
Keep the price constant as long as the evolution provides allocations of  
available resources, and change them only when the viability is at stakes. 
Indeed, as long as the state of the system lies in the interior of the 
allocation set (the set of states satisfying scarcity constraints), any price will 
work. Therefore, the system can maintain the price inherited from the past. 
This happens if the system obeys the inertia principle. Since the allocations 
may evolve while the price remains constant, the total consumption may 
reach the boundary of the set of scarce resources with an "outwardn velocity. 
This event corresponds t o  a period of crisis: To survive, the system must find 
another price such that  the new associated velocity forces the solution back 
inside the allocation set. Alternatively, if the scarcity constraints can evolve, 
another way to  resolve the crisis is to relax the constraints (by technological 
progress, for instance) so that the state of the system lies in the interior of 
the new allocation set. When this is not possible, strategies for structural 
change fail: by design, this means that the solution leaves the allocation set 
and "dies". 
This management by crisis or bankruptcy has been observed in economic 
history, so that we suggest to take these phenomena into account in the 
framework of this Inertia Principle7. 
0.7 Heavy Evolutions 
This inertia principle is not strong enough to select an evolution of a relevant 
price, since we have to  provide rules for choosing prices when viability is at  
stakes . 
The simplest one (and most often, the most reasonable one) is to assume 
that at  each instant, the prices are changed as slowly as possible. 
We called evolutions obeying this principle Uheavys evolutions", in the 
sense of heavy trends. Hence heavy evolution is obtained by requiring a t  
each instant the (norm of the) velocity of the price to be as small as possible. 
Therefore, for implementing this inertia principle, we have to provide 
conditions under which relevant prices p(-) are differentiable (almost ev- 
erywhere), to built the differential inclusion which governs the evolution of 
differentiable relevant prices and then, select a differential equation in this 
differential inclusion (called a "dynamical closed loop") which will obey the 
inertia principle. 
In summary, given the decentralized behavior of  the consumers described 
by the differential equations z: = c;(z;,p) and the set of  scarce resources, we 
can built the dynamics w governing the behavior of  the market, so that the 
'This Inertia Principle provides an explanation of the concept punctuated equilibrium 
introduced in 1972 by Elredge and Gould in paleontology. Excavations a t  Kenya's Lake 
Turkana have provided clear evidence of evolution from one species to  another. The rock 
strata there contain a series of fossils that show every small step of an evolution journey 
that seems to have proceeded in fits and starts. Examination of more than 3,000 fossils 
by P. Williamson showed how 13 species evolved. The record indicated that the animals 
stayed much the same for immensely long stretches of time. But twice, about two million 
years ago and then, 700,000 years ago, the pool of life seemed to explode - set off, 
apparently, by a drop in the lake's water level. Intermediate forms appeared very quickly, 
new species evolving in 5,000 to 50,000 years, after millions of years of constancy, leading 
paleontologists to challenge the accepted idea of continuous evolution. 
'This is justified by the fact that the velocity of the price is related to the acceleration 
of the consumptions, and thus, the iverse of the mass. 
evolution of the economic system is described by the system of differential 
equations 
{ i)  z:(t) = ci(z;(t), p(t)) ( i  = 1, . . . , n) ii) ~ ' ( 2 )  = wl(z(t),p(t)) 
Contrary t o  other dynamical models, this law governing the evolution of 
prices is not a modeling assumption, but a consequence of the modeling 
data of this elementary model. 
In summary, we assume implicitly that the "Marketn follows an "oppor- 
tunisticnm Uconservativen and "lazyn behavior of the system: a behavior 
which enables the system to  allocate scarce resources among consumers as 
long as  any price makes possible its regulation and to  keep this price as long 
as it is possible. 
We shall attempt to  explain the evolution of allocations and prices and 
to  reveal the concealed feedbacks which allow the system to  be regulated by 
prices. 
We illustrate the concept of heavy solution by the simplest dynamical 
economic model (one commodity, one consumer.) 
0.8 A Simple Economic Example. 
Let K := [0, b] the subset of a scarce commodity z. Assume that the con- 
sumption rate of our greedy consumer is equal to  a > 0, so that, without 
any further restriction, her exponential consumption will leave the alloca- 
tion subset [0, b]. Hence her consumption is slowed down by a price (which 
is regarded as a control). In summary, the evolution of its consumption is 
governed by the system 
for almost all t 2 0, zl(t) = az(t) - p(t), where p(t) 2 0 
subjected t o  the constraints 
V t 2 0, z(t) E [0, b] 
(See figure 1) We see at  once that the viable equilibria of the system range 
over the equilibrium line p = az. 
The regulation map is given by the formula 
lIK (0) = (01, l I ~ ( z )  = R+ when z €10, b[ & l I ~ ( b )  = [ab, t o o [  
Lndeed, if z = 0, the velocity should be non negative, and the only price 
we can achieve it is p := 0. If 0 < z < b, any velocity allows to keep the 
state between 0 and b for a short period of time, so that any price can be 
used. If z = b, then the velocities z' = ab - p should be non positive to keep 
the state in the interval (0, b]. 
Viability is thus guaranteed each time that the price p(t) is chosen in 
II(z(t)), i.e., p = 0 when z = 0 (and thus, the system cannot leave the 
equilibrium because negative prices are not allowed 'to startw the system) 
and p 1 ab when z = b, so that the price is large enough to stop or decrease 
consumption. 
Assume that the system obeys the inertia principle: it keeps the price 
constant as long as it works. Take for instance zo > 0 and po E [O,azo[. 
Then the consumption increasesg and when it reaches the boundary b of the 
interval, the system has to switch very quickly to a velocity large enough to 
slow down the consumption for the solution to remain in the interval [0, b]. 
But there is a bound to the growth of prices (and inflation rates), so that 
we should set a bound on price velocities: Ip'(t)( 5 c. We shall associate with 
such a bound a "last warning" threshold to modify the price: there is a level of 
consumption after which it will be impossible to  slow down the consumption 
with a velocity smaller than or equal to c to forbid it to increase beyond the 
boundary b. 
We shall find this bound and introduce heavy solutions which will be 
studied in greater generality later for building this regulation law. They are 
the one whose controls evolve with the 'smallest velocity". 
We thus consider the solutions to the system 
i) for almost all t 1 0, z'(t) = az(t) - p(t) 
i i)  and - c 5 p'(t) 5 c (0.1) 
which are viable in [0, b] x R+. 
We introduce the functions p! and pb, defined on [0, oo[ by 
2 i)  Pk(P) := ~ ( e - ~ p l ~  - 1 + qp) = ,, 
ii) p!(p) := - ~ e ~ ( p - ~ ~ ) l ~ / a ~  + p/a + c/a2 
'it is equal to e''(afo~po)tp~. 
and the functions r! and rk defined on [0, b] by 
( i )  rk(z) = p if and only if z = p:(p) 
ii) r!(z)  = o if z E [ o , ~ ! ( o ) ]  ( p ! ( ~ )  = $( l  - e - a 2 b / c ) )  
( iii) r!(z)  = p if and only if z = when z E [p!(0), b] 
We shall show that these maps r! and r: are solutions to  the nonlinear 
"first-order partial differential inclusion" 
and that they can be regarded as planning procedures. 
We introduce now the set-valued map RC defined by1' 
There exist solutions to  (0.1) if and only if the initial state satisfies po E 
RC(xo). In this case, prices and commodities are related by the regulation law: 
Lndeed, set pU(t) := po + ct and pb(t) := po - ct and denote by zi(.) and 
zb ( - )  the solutions starting a t  zo t o  differential equations zt = az - pH(t) 
and zt = az - pt(.) respectively. Then any solution (z( . ) ,p(- ) )  to  the system 
(0.1) satisfies pb(.) 5 p ( - )  5 and thus, zn(.) 5 z( .)  5 zb( - )  because 
We also observe that the equations of the curves t  H (zn(t),pi(t)) and 
t  H (zb( t ) ,pb( t ) )  passing through (zo,uo) are solutions t o  the differential 
equations 
1 1 b  dp! = -(ap! - p)dp & dpb, = --(ap, - p)dp 
C C 
''By using tools of set-valued analysis, and in particular, the concept of contingent 
derivative DR(z,u) of a set-valued map R, we shall see that RC is a set-valued solution 
to the first-order partial differential inclusion 
and actually, the largest one with closed graph. 
Figure 1: Evolution of a Heavy Solution 
Figure 2: Other Solutions and Semipermeability of the Boundary 
0 
Examples of other solutions (0.1) where the velocities u' of the controla are randomly gener- 
ated. This computer simulation (due to Morin k Vandanjon) illustrates the Quincarnpoix 
Theorem (which is not prove in this lecture notes) on the semipermeability property of 
the part of the boundary of the "viability kerneln contained in the interior of [0, b] x R+ : 
The solutions which reach this boundary cannot come back to it, and have to remain on 
its boundary. 
the solutions of which are 
i) p!(p) = ea(p-po)lc(zO - n / a  - c/a2) + p/a + c/a2 
ii) pL(p) = ea(pO-p)/c(zo - po/a + c/a2) + p/a - c/a2 
Let pL be the solution passing through (O,O), which is equal to p:(p) = 
3 ( e  -"PIC - 1 + :p) and p!(p) = -cea(p-"*)lC/a2 +p/a + c/a2 be the solution 
passing through the pair (ab, b). 
- IF PO > rL(zo), T H E N  A N Y  SOLUTION (z(-),p(.)) STARTING FROM 
(zo,po) LEAVES Graph(RC): it satisfies 
because pL(.) is nondecreasing. Hence, when z(tl) = 0, we deduce that 
p(tl ) > 0, so that such solution is not viable. 
- IF 0 I Po < ~!(ZO), AN Y SOLUTION (z(.), ?/(-)) STARTING FROM 
(zo,po) LEAVES Graph(RC): it satisfies inequalities 
Therefore, when z(tl)  = b for some time tl ,  its velocity zl(tl)  = ab - p(tl) 
is positive, so that the solution is not viable. 
- It remains to show that starting from any point (zo,po) of the 
graph of RC, there exist heavy solutions. 
Naturally, if we start from an equilibrium, both the state and the controls 
can be kept constant. 
We now investigate the cases when the initial control is below or above 
the equilibrium line. 
Consider the case when zo > 0 and the price po E [r!(zo),azo[. Since 
we want to choose the price velocity with minimal norm, we take pl(t) = 0 
as long as the solution z(.) to the differential equation z' = a z  - po yields 
a consumption z(t) < When for some time tl, the consumption 
z(tl)  = so the solution has to be slowed down. Indeed, otherwise 
(z(tl + &),PO) will be below the curve p! and we saw that in this case, 
any solution starting from this situation will eventually cease to be viable. 
Therefore, prices should increase to slow down the consumption growth. The 
idea is to take the smallest velocity p' such that the vector (z'(tl),pl) takes 
the state inside the graph of RC: they are the velocities p' 2 ~ ' ( t ~ ) / p : ( ~ ) .  
By construction, it is achieved by the velocity of xN(-), which is the highest 
one allowed t o  increase prices. Therefore, by taking 
and p(t) := po + c(t - t l )  for t E [tl, tl + (a6 - po)/c], we get a solution which 
ranges over the curve zn(t) = p!(pfl(t)). This a heavy solution because, for 
the same reason as above, the smallest velocity of the price (which is unique 
along this curve) is chosen. According t o  the above differential equation, 
we see that  z( t )  increases to  b where it arrives with velocity 0 and the price 
increases linearly until it  arrives a t  the equilibrium price ab. Since (6, ab) 
is an equilibrium, the heavy solution stays there: we take x(t)  = b and 
p(t) E ab when t 2 t1 + po/c. So we have built a viable solution starting 
from (xo, PO). 
Consider now the case when po E [axo, rL(zo)], where we follow the same 
construction of the heavy viable solution. We start by taking p'(t) = 0. 
Thus, p(t) = po, as long as the solution x(-) to  the differential equation z' = 
ax - po, which decreases, satisfies z(t)  > Then, when x(tl) = 
for some t l ,  we take 
and p(t) := po -c(t -21) for t E [tl, tl  +po/c] in order t o  prevent the solution 
from leaving the graph of Rc. Finally, for t 2 tl + po/c, we take x(t) = 0 
and p(t) r 0. 
R e m a r k  - We observe that for any x €10, b[, 
n lim rL(z) = lim rc(x) = ax,  lim r!(x) = 0 & lim rL(x) = +oo 
c-O+ c+O+ c-cm c+m 
Quincampoix has proved that the part of the boundary of  the graph of  Rc 
which lies in the interior of the cylinder [0, b] xR+ is a barrier. This means that  
from any point (z,p),  all viable solutions remain on the part of the boundary 
contained in the interior of the cylinder. They cannot enter the graph of  RC. 
Once the solution bumps onto such a part of the boundary, its trajectory 
remains on i t ,  and there is no way, in this example, for the price t o  evolve 
with a velocity smaller than c in absolute value. 
In a daily language, if one interprets situations where the pair (z ,p )  lies 
in the boundary of the graph of RC as a crisis, there is no possibility to  get 
out of this crisis situation as long the pair ( z , p )  is in the interior of the 
cylinder. 
This phenomenon is illustrated by computer simulations represented in 
figure 2. Velocities of the prices are generated randomly. As soon as the 
solution butts against the boundary of the graph, it continues t o  evolve on 
the boundary. 
0.9 Outline 
This first part, which we have tried to  keep as self-contained as we could, 
cover the two main view points brought t o  this basic problem of allocation 
of scarce resources when the behavior of consumers is represented by utility 
functions. 
It deals with the problem of optimal allocation of resources in the frame- 
work of Convex Analysis and its Duality Theory, of which we summarize the 
very basic facts". Its main purpose is t o  show that this optimal allocation 
problem conceals the two main rival dynamical processes which compete in 
the economic literature: The Walras titonnement model and the Nontiton- 
nement model. Starting with utility functions which represent the behavior 
of consumers, one can derive 
1. demand and supply maps, and then, the concept of excess demand on 
which the titonnement dynamics are built, and the associated equi- 
libria, the Walras equilibrium prices, 
2. change and pricing maps, and then, the nontitonnement dynamical 
economy which can be built, and the associated equilibria, made of 
allocations which are not changed by the consumers. 
We shall supply the proofs of the continuous and discrete versions of the 
gradient methods we shall provide in this context both the tttonnement 
model and a nontttonnement algorithm (at least, in the continuous case). 




The first type of selection mechanism of an allocation which comes up 
t o  the mind is an optimization mechanism permitting to  select an allocation. 
For doing so, we need to  introduce a collective utility function 
and to  look for an allocation 
maximizing the utility function U: 
5 E K & U(2) = sup U(z) 
xEK 
This concept of utility function played (and is still playing) a crucial role in 
economic theory, and has been a t  the origin and the them of many heated 
debates. 
Among the first question which arises is the following: who will choose 
this collective utility function ?, the public interest (who knows it ?), a 
dictator ?, a planning bureau ? 
Since the n consumers are composing the Ucollectivity" whose behavior 
is described by the collective utility function U, one generally acquiesces 
to  build U from the utility functions U; of the consumers. For instance, 
the collective utility function is a weighted sum of the individual utility 
functions: 
n 
In this case, the problem is shifted to  the one of choosing the weights A; 
attributed to  each consumer. This is typically a game-theoretical issue. But 
even if we assume that this problem of allotting weights among consumers is 
solved, the question remains to  know whether utility functions are the right 
metaphors for the behavior of consumers. Indeed, the concept of utility 
function has raised and still raises many issues. 
The cardinality versus ordinality dispute is by now settled. Many economists 
did challenge the possibility for any economic agent to  associate with any 
commodity a cardinal number measuring her utility or satisfaction and 
stressed the fact that  utility functions played uniquely an "ordinal" role 
for comparing two commodities. What matter is the preference preorder 5 
defined by 
z 5 y if and only if U(z) 2 U(y) 
Recall that  a preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation, complete 
if any two elements are comparable, partial in the opposite case. 
We can associate with any preorder the equivalence relation - defined 
by 
z - y if and only if z 5 y & y 5 z 
The "projection" of the preorder to  the factor space X/ - is then an order 
relation. 
If cp : R o R is an increasing function, then the utility functions U and 
cp o U generate the same preference preorder. 
Hence the problem of representing any given preference preorder by a 
utility function was a real issue, because, in particular, the lexicographic 
order in Rn cannot be associated with a continuous utility function. Debreu 
ended this debate by giving reasonable sufficient conditions for a preorder on 
a finite dimensional vector-space to  be represented by a continuous utility 
function. 
Utility functions do not provide the more judicious representation of a 
consumer in a dynamical framework. In this case, concepts of change or 
transformations in a given direction v are better embodied in the various 
concepts of directional derivatives. Starting from a commodity z E Y in 
a direction v, the satisfaction caused by this move can be described by the 
infinitesimal utility increment measured by adequate limits of the differential 
quotients 
U(z + hv) - U(z) 
h 
when h o O+ (the usual gradient is no longer sufficient, because in many 
cases, utility functions being built not only through standard algebraic op- 
erations, but also by supremum or infimum, are no longer differentiable in 
the classical sense. Nonsmooth analysis is then required.) 
Nowadays, the concept of rationality became synonymous of the narrow 
notion of making optimal decisions. An individual, regarded as a decision- 
maker, is then reduced to  an utility function postulated t o  summarize her 
behavior. Even the broader conceit of the ability of making transitive infer- 
ences is more a dream than a reality, as cognitive psychology acknowledges 
nowadays. 
We shall see later that  both in the static and dynamical frameworks, we 
can discard utility functions. 
However, because of the historical importance of this point of view on 
one hand, and the importance of optimization theory on the other hand, we 
shall recall the main results of optimization theory in this framework. 
Convexity will play a major role in this study, and, in particular, utility 
functions will be assumed t o  be concave. In order to avoid using both 
adjectives, convex and concave, we shall avoid maximizing concave functions 
and we simply shall minimize convex functions. This is the reason why we 
shall replace utility functions U by ... loss functions V := -U!, asking 
economists t o  forsake their traditions for the comfort (or laziness) of the 
mathematicians. 
We devote the first section t o  state the Optimal Allocation Theorem 
in the convex case. Indeed, convex analysis goes much beyond providing 
the mere existence of an optimal allocation. Duality Theory exhibits prices 
that  emerge from the problem, which solve an associated dual optimization 
problem. Duality Theory of Convex Analysis reveals demand and supply maps 
on one hand, change and pricing maps on the other, which are concealed in 
this simple optimization problem. 
It shows that  such a price clears the market, in the sense that  the optimal 
allocation is made of consumptions which belong to  the demand maps of 
each consumer and that  the total consumption is in the supply map. 
It demonstrates in a dual way that for such a price, consumers never 
change tehir consumptions. 
I t  exhibits also the marginal property of such a price, which measures the 
marginal variations of the collective utilities when the set of scarce resources 
is perturbed. 
Last but not least, i t  conceals two dynamical algorithms which are the 
prototypes of both the Walras titonnement model (which is not viable) and 
the nontitonnement model which we shall study in the third part. 
The Walras titonnement model is nothing else than the (continuous) 
gradient method applied t o  the Udual minimization problemn. It states 
that  the variations of the prices are in the excess demand (demand minus 
supply) maps: I t  increases whenever demand increases. One can prove 
that it converges to  an equilibrium price, which is a Walras equilibrium for 
this particular excess demand map. But, as it was already mentioned, the 
associated consumptions do not constitute an docat ion whenever the price 
is not an equilibrium. 
But thanks to the concept of subdifferentiability of nondifferentiable con- 
vex functions, one can show that the (continuous) gradient method applied 
to the initial optimization problem provides the evolution of consumptions 
which form a t  each instant allocations and which converges to an optimal 
allocation. Indeed, not only Convex Analysis reveals demand and supply 
maps, but also the change and pricing maps with which we shall build the 
general nontiitonnement models of Part 3 and beyond. 
The next sections supply the minimum needed in Convex Analysis and 
Duality Theory to prove this Theorem. We shall not prove however the 
theorem stating the existence, uniqueness and convergence of solutions to 
gradient inclusions x'(t) E -dV(x(t)). 
1 Allocations of Scarce Resources 
1.1 The Commodity Space 
An economic commodity is by definition a good or a service supplied with a 
measure unit. Commodities can be dated, localized, contingent, etc. In this 
case, they are different. Two dated commodities with different dates and 
otherwise the same characteristics are different commodities. 
Actually, one can characterize commodities by the services which they 
produce. 
In summary, we start with 1 commodities labeled h = 1, . . . ,1 and we 
denote by 
eh := (0,. . . , I  ,..., 0) E Y := R' 
the unit commodity h (where 1 is a t  the h place). 
We begin by assuming that the commodities are indefinitely divisible. This 
a quite rough approximation of economic reality, but an imperative one 
which allows to describe mathematically the space of commodities as a finite 
dimensional vector-space. 
A commodity bundle, or, in a more descriptive way, a commodity basket, 
is a basket made of xl units of commodity 1, 2 2  units of commodity 2, ... , 
XI units of commodity 1. It is represented by the vector 
For the sake of simplicity, we shall speak from now on of commodities 
instead of commodity bundles or baskets. 
So, the familiar finite dimensional vector-space Y := R' is regarded as 
the commodity space, the canonical basis of which is made of the units of 
goods. 
Naturally, some commodities will be eliminated, such as, for instance, 
commodities with negative units, which, a t  first glance, do not make sense. 
Actually, it may be wise to  accept negative goods if they are adequately 
interpreted. Later on, we will distinguish among produced commodities and 
consumed commodities. One may represent for instance consumed com- 
modities with a positive sign and produced commodities with a negative 
sign. Or, as another example, labor can be regarded as a negative leisure. 
Why do we represent the commodity space by the finite dimensional 
vector-space R'? The reason is that we can indeed add commodities and 
multiply them by scalars, i.e., perform linear combinations of commodities. 
Therefore, we shall be able to  exploit the rich structure of linear spaces. 
1.2 The Value Space 
Very early economic activity, actually, trading activity, required the com- 
parison of two commodities before an exchange, or a barter or swap. This is 
done by associating with each commodity its value expressed in accounting 
or monetary units, such as the ECU (European Currency Unit), the Franc, 
the Dollar, etc. 
Even though barter is still used (in international trade), the idea to  use 
a specific commodity, easy to  handle and sufficiently divisible (liquid), as a 
unique mean of comparison appeared quite early. In order to compare two 
arbitrary commodities, each of them is compared with this specific one. 
This specific commodity used to  compare arbitrary commodities is called 
the nurniraire. The value of a commodity can be expressed in amounts of 
units of numCraire judged equivalent to  this commodity. 
The choice of a numdraire requires a consensus among the economic 
agents trading the commodities, the faith or belief that everyone agrees on 
the common value of the unit of numCraire. This is why the numCraire is 
called a fiduciary good. 
Economic history shows the evolution of numdraires, from specific and 
useful goods (camels, cows, etc.) to  seldom employable goods (like shells, 
gold, etc.) to  paper money and now, to  abstract figures concealed in com- 
puter memories of some banks. Nowadays, the numdraire is made of an 
explicit, although abstract, commodity bundle used to make an index. 
On should note confuse money with either accounting units or numkraire. 
Money has no definite meaning, conveys many different kinds of concepts 
and play different roles (storage of values, reward for risk taking, etc.). 
Here, sociopsychology, in the sense of psychology of masses, plays an 
important role, since the consensus on the choice of a numdraire must be 
reached before we can use it in an economic model. 
Hence, the choice of a numdraire and its value depend upon the set of 
economic agents which accept it and evolves with time. Hence, the space of 
values is one dimensional space, the unit of which is the unit of account, the 
Lira of May 15, 1992 for instance. 
Actually, in complex economies of today, there are many different fidu- 
ciary goods, which add to the space of physical commodities (subject to 
inviolable scarcity constraints) a more and more complex space of fiduciary 
commodities (subject to psychological constraints, resulting from unknown 
psychological mechanisms governing the emergence of fashions, etc.). This 
aspect of things will not be taken into account in these lectures, naturally, 
but they should be kept in mind in order not to rely too much to  the very 
unassuming and crude mathematical description of our humble economic 
problem. 
1.3 The Price Space 
How can two commodities be compared through a numdraire ? The simple 
idea is, as we have said, to express the value of each commodities in terms 
of units of numbraire. 
The mechanism which associates with a commodity this amount of numdraire 
is what is called the price system or simply, the price. A price p is then a 
map from the commodity space Y to  the values space R,  associating to  each 
commodity its value. 
Since we have represented the commodity space by a vector space, in 
which one can perform linear combination of commodities, it is natural to 
continue to accept the relevance of the linear structure and to assume that 
the price is linear: the value of the sum of two commodities is the sum of 
the values and the value of X times a commodity is X times its value. In 
other words, 
~ ( X l z l  + J222) = XIP(ZI) + Xzp(z2) 
The Price Space is then the dual Y* := C(Y, R )  of the Commodity Space. 
We shall supply the Price Space with the dual basis 
where e i  associates with any commodity (basket) z := (~h)h=~,...,[ E Y the 
amount of units of the hth commodity: ez(z) = zh. 
We then deduce that 
1 
This shows that p := (x ei(z)p(eh)) is a linear combination of the ele- 
h=1 
ments of the canonical basis. The components ph := p(eh) of p in this dual 
basis is the value of the unit of commodity h, what is meant in the day to 
day language by the price of h. 
We the write 
I 
~ ( z )  = x p h z h  =: (p,z) 
h=l  
This nondegenerate bilinear form 
(p, z )  E Y* x Y I-+ (p, 2) := p(z) E R 
is called the duality pairing. 
In general, we shall be led to choose nonnegative prices, i-e., prices in the 
positive cone 
R:' := {p E R'* I 2 O} 
This not always judicious. In instances when one consumer is forced 
to consume all available goods, it is sensible to accept negative prices. A 
glass of water in the desert may be attributed by someone a positive price, 
whereas in a dirty basement of a torture building, a victim is ready to 
attribute the last glass of water a negative price. Remember your childhood 
when a excessively caring mother forced you to finish your soup ... 
So, to  summarize, the first role played by a price is to compare two 
commodities z and y by comparing their value (p, z )  and (p, y). 
If a price p plays this role, so are the prices Ap for any positive scalar A. 
Therefore, one can change the scale of prices (or price level) without altering 
this role (this is called monetary illusion). 
So, we need a further condition to fix the price level. This is done by 
fixing the value of a numdraire w E Y: the unit of gold (the "Bretton Woods 
gold exchange standardn until Nixon cancelled it on August 13, 1971), a 
commodity basket entering the composition of an index, etc.: 
There are no longer Urealn numdraires nowadays, but commodity indexes, 
the value of which is observed and measured (rather than being fixed in an 
evolving - and not really controllable - world). 
This is time for a warning that in evolving models, the value of the 
numdraire evolves (although it should remain constant to  satisfy the expec- 
tations (or dreams) of economists and finance ministers). 
Here, we shall take for numdraire the commodity 
We shall agree to  take for price set the price simplex S1 defined by the 
normalization rule: 
1.4 The set of Resources 
We denote by M C Y the set of physical scarce resources to  be allocated 
among n consumers. 
Scarcity is the key word, the basic requirement without which there 
would be no need of economics. 
When producers are taken into account, the commodities of M t o  be 
allocated among consumers are produced by producers. The set M thus 
depends upon past and present decisions of producers. At least for the 
beginning, we shall assume only that there is a constant set M of scarce 
resources available a t  each time to  consumers. 
The first law of economics we shall comply with states that it is impossible 
to consume more (physical) resources than available (by opposition to  fiduciary 
goods). 
Throughout this book, we assume mainly that M is a closed and that it 
satisfies the free disposal assumption: 
This means that any commodity y 5 z smaller than or equal to an 
available commodity z is still available. 
Since M is a set of resources, it should be bounded above in the sense 
that 
3 g E Y such that M C 3 - R: (1.2) 
(It cannot be bounded below because of the free disposal assumption). 
We shall assume sometimes, for simplicity, that M is convex: convex 
combinations of svarce resources are still available. 
This is interpreted by economists by saying that decreasing return to scale 
prevails. If further more M is a cone, they say that constant return to scale 
prevails. 
Actually, we shall be able to bypass this assumption in the dynamical 
caseI2. 
Later on, when evolution will be taken into account, i t  will be possi- 
ble to  have M depend upon the time and cumulated consequences of past 
allocations, in order to  take into account investments, pollution, etc.). 
1.5 Introducing the Consumers 
We begin now the mathematical description of the n consumers i = 1, . . . , n. 
It starts by her consumption set L; C Y, which represents the set of 
potential consumptions. Actually, it is better to  say that she will never 
accept a commodity outside her consumption set L;.  Most often, L; is 
chosen to be the orthant R:. 
Throughout this book, we assume mainly that the consumption sets L; 
are closed. 
Consumers are often assumed to  have no satiation: this means that they 
is no limit to  their desire to  squanderI3. We describe it in mathematical 
terms by stating that L; = Li + R:. 
We shall assume also that L; is bounded below, i.e., that 
Again, for simplicity, we shall sometimes assume that the consumptions 
sets are convex. 
12and replace it by a regularity assumption called sleekness. 
13Despite its first glance appeal, this assumption is not always sensible. 
1.6 The Set of Allocations 
We translate now the first economic law: it is impossible to consume more 
(physical) commodities than available by introducing the set K of allocations 
of scarce resources among n consumers. 
We denote by X := Yn = Rln the Consumption Space of the n con- 
sumers. We set 
2 := (z l , .  . . , zn)  E X 
where z; does no longer denote a component of a commodity bundle, but 
the commodity bundle of consumer i14. 
Therefore, the set of allocations is equal t o  
Conforming to  the first economic law amounts to  evolving in the allo- 
cation set K or to  choosing elements (optimal ones or equilibria) in this 
allocation set. 
Consequently, to  proceed further, we need to  make novel assumptions 
on the nature of the questions to  answer and the behavior of consumers. 
If everyone may easily agree on accepting the first economic law, the 
consensus about the behaviors of consumers and the way to  describe them 
mathetically is far to  be perfect and bound to evolve. 
2 The Optimal Allocation Theorem 
For simplicity, we shall incorporate the weights Xi and the consumption sets 
L; in the loss functions V, : Y H R U {+m) of the consumers i = 1,. . . , n 
by setting 
-X;U;(z) if z E L; 
K(z )  := 
if z 4 L; 
Hence, an optimal allocation Z = (TI,. . . ,Tn) is a solution to  the minimiza- 
tion problem 
n n 
v := inf z V ; ( z i )  = ~ V ; ( E )  
"EK ;=I i=l 
"It is hoped that this slight abuse of notation is forgiven by the reader. The context 
should efface any ambiguity. 
where 
We shall assume that 
V q E R!+ , inf ( ( 9 ,  z )  + K ( z ) )  > -oo ZELi 
and that the set of scarce resources M satisfy 
i )  M = M - R!+ is a closed convex subset 
i i )  M c y - R ! +  - (2.2) 
From the knowledge of the loss functions and the set of scarce resources 
we shall extract concealed features on the behavior of the consumers. 
2.1 Demand and Change Maps 
We shall denote by 
B;(g) := { z i  E R1 I (q ,  z ; )  + K ( z i ) )  = inf,((q, z )  + ~ ( z ) ) )  (2.3) ZER 
the Walrasian demand of consumer i ,  
B;(q, r )  := { z  € Dom(V,) I (9 ,  z )  5 r )  
the budget set of consumer i and by 
z; t B;(q,  r )  ,V.(z;) = inf K ( z )  ) 
z€Bi(p,r)  
her demand set. The demand map is the set-valued map (q ,  r )  -., D;(q,  r ) .  
We observe at once that 
is independent of the choice of Z; E D;(q,  ( 9 , ~ ~ ) ) .  
Change maps Ci : L; x S' -., Y* which express the satisfaction of con- 
sumer i ,  are defined by: 
In other words, p E Ci(z, q) is the price for which the commodity z minimizes 
the sum of the loss K(y) + (q, y) and the cost (p, y). 
If the loss function V; is differentiable a t  z, then C; is single-valued and 
can be written 
C;(z,q) = -F1(z) - q 
We observe that 
0 E Ci(zi, q) if and only if z j  E Ej(q) 
In summary, we can associate with any consumer i represented by a loss 
function VI. a demand map Bi associating with any price q a set of  commodities 
minimizing her loss under budgetary constraints and a change map C, associ- 
ating with any price q the change o f  consumption. 
2.2 Supply and Pricing Maps 
We associate now with the set M c Y of scarce resources the supply map 
SM associating with any q E Y* the supply set SM(q) C M defined by 
of scarce resources which maximize the income 
induced by the available resources. 
We also introduce the inverse NM := ~i' of the supply map SM: 
q E NM(y) if and only if y E S M ( ~ )  
which we regard as the pricing map. 
Assumption (2.2) implies that 
aM(q) < +oo if and only if q E R: 
We also observe that 
2.3 Optimal Allocations 
Theorem 2.1 Let us assume the set M of scarce resources satisfy assump- 
tions (2.2), that the consumption set L; are closed and convex and that the 
loss functions V; are nontrivial, convex and lower semicontinuous and satisfy 
assumptions (2.3). Assume furthermore that 
Then there exists an optimal allocation Z E K which is a solution to the 
optimal allocation problem 
v := inf XI$(%) 
=EK ;=I 
where 
Furthermore, there exists a price i j  E Y* such that 
a) the price q and the allocation ( T I , .  . . , T n )  satisfy 
... 
i) V i = 1,  ..., n, E D;(q) 
i.e., each Z; belongs to consumer i's demand set I n 4 ii) C Z ;  E S ~ ( i j )  
i=l 
n 
i .e., C 3 ;  maximizes the available income (7, y) 
i=l 
6) the optimal price i j  clears the market in the sense when it is a solution 




stating that the supply SM(i j )  *. balanced by the total demand C B;(ij). 
i=1 
c)  the optimal allocation Z is an equilibrium of the associated nontciton- 
nement pmess  in the sense that 
i )  V i = l ,  ... n, 0 E C;(Z;,q) 
- 
i i )  E NM (ELl x i )  
We shall also prove that this price Zj enjoys a marginal property. We 
introduce perturbations on the resources and we define the marginal function 
v associating with any resource y the optimal value 
v ( y )  := inf x K ( K )  
ZEK(V)  j = l  
where 
We observe that v ( 0 )  = v .  Naturally, the marginal function v is not 
necessarily differentiable. But it is convex, and we shall extend the concept 
of differential to  a concept of subdifferential. With this notion, we shall prove 
that Zj belongs to the subdifferential of the marginal function at y := 0 .  
2.4 The Walras Tdtonnement 
Since we have associated with any consumer her demand map 5; and we 
have defined a supply map SM, we can define the continuous tstonnement 
process defined by 
which is a metaphor for the law of supply and demand. Then the following 
result hods true: 
Theorem 2.2 We posit the assumptions of Theorem 2.1. For any positive 
initial price go, there ezists a unique solution q ( - )  to the thtonnernent process 
(2.5) starting at qo with converges to an equilibrium when t + +oo. 
Unfortunately, we have seen that tiitonnement processes are not viable. 
2.5 The Nontiitonnement Process 
However, we can design another dynamical process which is viable, through 
change maps C; : Li x S1 .u Y which express the satisfaction of consumer i .  
We then define the dynamical behavior of consumer i by the differential 
inclusion 
z i ( t )  E C i ( z i ( t ) ,  q ( t ) )  
which is controlled by the price q( t ) .  
Theorem 2.3 We posit the assumptions of Theorem 2.1. From any ini- 
tial allocation xo = (xO1,. . ., xOn) E K starts a unique solution x(-) = 
(xl(,), . . . , xn(-))  to the system of diflerential inclusions 
where the price q(t) satisfies 
and which are viable in K in the sense that 
n 
Furthermore, the total loss t -r x ~ ( x ; ( t ) )  decreases and the allocation x(t) 
i=l 
converges to an optimal allocation Z when t -, +oo. 
n 
Observe that  q(t) = 0 whenever the total consumption x x i ( t )  belongs to the 
i= 1 
interior of  the set M of scarce resources. 
Therefore, under convexity assumptions, one can derive from the prob- 
lem of optimal allocation many more informations than the mere existence 
of an optimal allocation. First, the concept of price emerges, and we can 
associate the concepts of demand maps and supply maps. We stated that  
there exists a price which clears the marker: the total optimal consumption 
is in the supply set and each optimal consumption belongs t o  the demand 
set. This price has marginal properties. 
The titonnement process can be defined, and, given an initial price, it 
has a unique solution converging to  an equilibrium price. 
We can also derive decentralized dynamical processes of each consumer, 
described by a differential inclusion controlled by prices. Starting from any 
initial allocation, there exists a unique allocation evolving according t o  this 
controlled dynamical process which converges to  an optimal allocation when 
t H +oo. 
In the next parts, we shall answer the same type of questions (existence 
of an equilibrium, evolution of allocations) without grounding the  theory on 
the assumptions of (convex) utility functions. 
Convexity is indeed the main ingredient guaranteeing the above results. 
In order to prove them, we provide below the minimal exposition of convex 
analysis. 
3 Convex Functions 
3.1 Extended Functions and their Epigraphs 
A function V : X w R U {f oo) is called an extended (real-valued) function. 
Its domain is the set of points a t  which V is finite: 
Dom(V) := {z E X ( V(z) # f oo) 
A function is said to be nontrivialI5 if its domain is not empty. Any function 
V defined on a subset K C X can be regarded as the extended function VK 
equal to V on K and to  +oo outside of K ,  whose domain is K. 
Since the order relation on the real numbers is involved in the definition 
of the Lyapunov property as well as in minimization problems, we no longer 
characterize a real-valued function by its graph, but rather by its epigraph 
&p(V) := {(z, A)  E X x R 1 V(z) 5 A) 
or by its hypograph defined in a symmetric way by 
The graph of a real-valued function is then the intersection of its epigraph 
and its hypograph. 
We also remark that some properties of a function are actually properties 
of their epigraphs. For instance, an extended function V is convex (resp. 
positively homogeneous) if and only if its epigraph is convex (resp. a cone). 
The main examples of extended functions are the indicators qK of subsets 
K defined by 
i f z ~ K  
~ K ( Z )  := { !oo if not 
It can be regarded as a membership cost16 to K:  it costs nothing to  belong 
to K ,  and +oo to step outside of K .  
The indicator $K is lower semicontinuous if and only if K is closed and 
$K is convex if and only if K is convex. One can regard the sum V + $K as 
l S ~ u c h  a function is said to be proper in convex and non smooth analysis. We chose this 
terminology for avoiding confusion with proper maps. 
"Functions V : X r [0, +oo] can be regarded as  some kind of fuzzy sets, called toll sets. 
For Yuzzy differential inclusions" and "fuzzy viability", we refer to Chapter 10, Section 3 
of [16, Aubin]. 
the  restriction of V t o  K. Therefore, a constrained minimization problem 
is equivalent t o  a n  unconstrained one for a new criterion function, which 
embodies t he  constraints so  to speak: 
inf V ( x )  = inf ( V ( x )  + $ K ( x ) )  
2E K t E X  
We recall t he  convention inf(0) := +w. 
Lemma 3.1 Consider a function V : X H R U {f CQ). Its epigraph is 
closed if and only if 
V v E X, V ( v )  = lirn inf V ( v f )  
vl+v 
For extended functions V which never take the value -00, this is equivalent 
to the lower semicontinuity of V .  
Assume that the epigraph of V is a closed cone. Then the following 
conditions are equivalent: 
i) V v  E X, V ( v )  > -oo 
i i )  V ( 0 )  = 0 
i i i )  ( 0 ,  -1) $ &p(V)  
Proof - Assume that the epigraph of V is closed and pick v E X. There exists 
a sequence of elements v, converging to v such that 
lirn V(v,) = lim inf V(vl) 
n-+m vl-v 
Hence, for any A > liminf,~,, V(vl), there exist N such that,  for all n 2 N ,  
V(v,) < A ,  i.e., such that (v,,A) E Ep(V). By taking the limit, we infer that 
V(v) 5 A ,  and thus, that V(v) < lim infvl,, V(vl). The converse statement is 
obvious. 
Suppose next that the epigraph of V is a cone. Then it contains (0,O) and 
V(0) < 0. The statements ii) and iii) are clearly equivalent. 
If i) holds true and V(0) < 0, then 
belongs to the epigraph of V, as well as all (0, -A), and (by letting A -+ + m )  we 
deduce that V(0) = -m, so that i) implies ii). 
To end the proof, assume that V(0) = 0 and that for some v, V(v) = -m. 
Then, for any E > 0, the pair (v, -I/&) belongs to the epigraph of V, as well as the 
pairs (EV, -1). By letting E converge to 0, we infer that (0, -1) belongs also to the 
epigraph, since it is closed. Hence V(0) < 0, a contradiction. 
3.2 Subdifferential of Convex Functions 
Convex functions enjoy further properties. We already mentioned that an 
extended function is convex (respectively lower semicontinuous) if and only 
if its epigraph is convex (respectively closed.) 
Moreau and Rockafellar introduced the subdifferential of convex func- 
tions in the early 60's: 
Definition 3.2 Consider a nontrivial function V : X I+ R U {+m) and 
z E Dom(V). The closed convez subset aV(z) defined by 
(which may be empty) is called the subdifferential of V at z. We say that V 
is subdifferentiable at z if dV(z) # 0. 
From the definition, we see that the Fermat Rule follows immediately: 
Theorem 3.3 Let V : X I+ RU {+m) be a non trivial function. Then the 
following conditions are equivalent: 
i )  0 E aV(5) (the Fermat Rule) 
i i )  Z minimizes V 
We also observe that the concept of subdifferential generalizes the con- 
cept of gradient in the following sense: 
Proposition 3.4 If V : X I+ R U {+m) is convez and diflerentiable at a 
point z E Int(Dom(V)), then 
Proof - First, the gradient V1(z) belongs to dV(z), since, V being 
convex, inequalities 
imply by letting h converge to 0 that 
Conversely, if p E aV(z),  we obtain, by taking y = z + hu that 
V(z + hu) - V(z) (P, 21) I h 
By letting h converge to 0, we infer that for every u E X ,  (p, u) I (Vf(z), u), 
so that p = V1(z). 
Proposition 3.5 The subdifferential map z a V ( z )  is monotone in the 
sense that 
Proof - Indeed, since 
we deduce the monotonicity of the subdifferential by adding those two in- 
equalities. 
Monotone maps, and above all, maximal monotone maps, enjoy many 
of the properties of positive linear operators. We refer to  [24, Aubin & 
Ekeland] for more details on monotone maps. 
We recall the following important property of convex functions defined 
on finite dimensional vector-spaces: 
Theorem 3.6 A convez junction defined on a finite dimensional vector- 
space is locolly Lipschitz and subdifferentiable on the interior of its domain. 
(See for instance [24, Aubin & Ekeland.] for a proof.) 
Therefore, in order to apply Fermat Rule, we need a Subdifferentiable 
Calculus, for which we need the concept of conjugate functions. This is how 
prices will emerge when we shall apply the Fermat Rule to the optimization 
problem (0.5). 
But we have to  mention right now that the Fermat Rule replaces the 
minimization problem by an equilibrium problem: Indeed, the inclusion 
shows that the constant function z ( t )  Z is a solution to  the differential 
inclusion 
for almost all t 2 0, z ' ( t )  E - a V ( z )  
(continuous descent method or subdifferential algorithm). 
Actually, we shall show that such differential inclusions do have solutions 
in section 1.4. 
Theorem 3.7 Assume that V : X H R U {+oo) is nontrivial, convez, 
lower semicontinuous and bounded below. Then, for any initial state zo E 
Dom(V),  there ezists a unique solution to the differential inclusion 
for almost all  t 2 0,  z l ( t )  E - a V ( z )  (3.2) 
starting at zo. 
Let Vd ( z ) )  denote the element of a V ( z )  with the smallest norm. Then 
the solution z ( . )  is slow in the sense that for almost any t ,  the norm of the 
velocity z l ( t )  is the smallest one: 
for almost all t _> 0,  z l ( t )  = -Vd(z(t))  
Furthermore, if V is inf-compact, then z ( t )  converges when t -+ oo to a limit 
2,  which achieves the minimum of V :  
lim V ( z ( t ) )  = inf V ( z )  = V ( z , )  
t 4 0 0  2EX 
Theorem 3.8 Let us assume that a convez function V : X H R is bounded 
below. 
Assume also that the steps of the subgradient algorithm 
where pn E aV(z , )  satisfy 
Then the decreasing sequence of scalars 
6 k  := min V ( z n )  
n=O, ..., k 
converges to the infimum v := infzEx V ( z )  of V when k + CQ. 
We shall prove this theorem in Section 1.5, as well as a generalization to  the 
case of lower semicontinuous extended convex functions. 
3.3 Support Functions and Conjugate Functions 
There is more to that: lower semicontinuous convex functions enjoy duality 
properties. In the same way that we associated with cones their polar cones, 
with closed convex processes their transposes, we can, following Fenchel, 
associate with lower semicontinuous convex functions conjugate functions' for 
the same reasons, and with the same success. 
Definition 3.0 Let K be a nonempty subset of a finite dimensional vector- 
space X .  We associate with any continuous linear form p € X* 
The function OK : X* H R U {+m) is called the support function of K .  We 
say that the subsets of X* defined by 
i) K- := { p  E X* 1 a ~ ( p )  5 0) 
ii) K L  := {p  E X * ( V z  E K, < p , z > =  0) 
are the (negative) polar cone, and orthogonal of K respectively. 
Examples 
When K = {z), then a ~ ( p )  = < p, z > 
When K = Bx, then ~ B , ( P )  = (lp((* 
If K is a cone, then 
When K = 0, we set a@(p)  = -m for every p E X*. 
We observe that 
and in particular, that if P is a cone, then 
The Separation Theorem17 can be stated in the following way: 
Theorem 3.10 (Separation theorem) Let K be a nonempty subset of a 
Banach space X .  Its closed convex hull is characterized by linear constmint 
inequalities in the following way: 
Furthermom, there is a bijective correspondence between nonernpty closed con- 
vex subsets o f  X and nontrivial lower semicontinuous positively homogeneous 
convex functions on X*. 
Since the epigraph of a lower semicontinuous convex function is a closed 
convex subset, it is tempting t o  compute its support function, and in par- 
ticular, t o  observe that 
Definition 3.11 Let V : X -+ R U {+m) be any nontrivial eztended func- 
tion defined on a finite dimensional vector-space X. We associate with it its 
conjugate function V* : X* -+ R U {+oo) defined on the dual of X by 
V p  E X*, V*(p) := sup(< p , z  > -V(z)) 
Its biconjugate Vff : X w R U {f oo) is defined by 
VW(z) := sup (< p, z > -V*(p)) 
P E X *  
We see a t  once that the conjugate function of the indicator o f  a subset 
K is the support function UK. 
We deduce from the definition the following convenient inequality 
v z E X,  p E X*, < p , z  > I V(z)  + V*(p) 
"This Separation Theorem is one corner stone of linear and convex functional anal- 
ysis. It was discovered by the German mathematician Minkowski at the beginning of 
this century in finite dimensional spaces and extended in the 30's by Hahn, an Austrian 
mathematician, and Banach, the Polish founder of Linear Functional Analysis, in Banach 
spaces and in Hausdorff locally convex spaces, including weak topologies of Banach spaces. 
It is then known under the name of the Hahn-Banach Theorem. 
known as Fenchel's Inequality. The epigraphs of the conjugate and biconju- 
gate functions being closed convex subsets, the conjugate function is lower 
semicontinuous and convex and so is its biconjugate when it never takes the 
value -m. We observe that 
If equality holds, then V is convex and lower semicontinuous. The con- 
verse statement, a consequence of the Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem, is 
the first basic theorem of convex analysis: 
Theorem 3.12 A nontrivial eztended function V : X -+ R U  {tm) is con- 
vez and lower semicontinuous if and only if it coincides with its biconjugate. 
In this case, the conjugate function V* is nontrivial. 
So, the Fenchel correspondence associating with any function V its con- 
jugate V* is a one to one correspondence between the sets of nontrivial lower 
semicontinuous convex functions defined on X and its dual X*. This fact is 
a t  the root of duality theory in convex optimization. 
Proof 
a) Suppose that a < V(z). Since the pair (z,a) does not belong to Ep(V), 
which is convex and closed, there exist a continuous, linear form (p, b) E X' x R 
and E > 0 such that 
Vy E DomV, VX 1 V(y), (p, y) - bX 5 (p, 2 )  - ba - E (3-3) 
by virtue of the Separation Theorem (Theorem 2.4). 
b) We note that b > 0. If not, we take y in the domain of V and X = V(y) + p .  
We would have 
Then we obtain a contradiction if we let p  tend to +oo. 
c) We show that if b > 0, then a < V"(z). In fact, we may divide the inequality 
(3.3) by b; whence, setting f~ = p/b and taking X = V(y), we obtain 
Then, taking the supremum with respect to y, we have 
V'(p) < (p, z)  - a. 
This implies that 
i) p belongs to  the domain of V* 
ii) a < @, z) - V*(p) I V" (2). (3.4) 
d) We consider the case in which z belongs to  the domain of V. In this case, b is 
always strictly positive. To see this, it is sufficient to take y = z and A = V(z) in 
formula (3.3) to show that 
since V(z) - a is a strictly-positive, real number. Then, from part b), we deduce 
the existence of p E DomV* and that a 5 VW(z) I V(z) for all a < V(z). Thus, 
V"(z) is equal to V(z). 
e) We consider the case in which V(z) = +m and a is an arbitrarily-large number. 
Either b is strictly positive, in which case part b) implies that 
a < V"(z), or b = 0. In the latter case, (3.3) implies that 
VY E DomV, (p, y - z )  + E I 0. (3.5) 
Let us take p in the domain of V* (we have shown that such an element exists, 
since Dom V is non-empty). Fenchel's inequality implies that 
We take p > 0, multiply the inequality (3.5) by p and add it to the inequality (3.6) 
to obtain 
Taking the supremum with respect to y, we obtain: 
which may be written in the form 
Takingp = a + V*(p) - (" which is strictly positive whenever a is large enough, 
& 
we have again proved that a 5 V"(z). Thus, since V"(z) is greater than an 
arbitrary finite number a ,  we deduce that V"(z) = +m. 
We deduce at once the  following characterization of t he  subdifferential: 
Proposition 3.13 Let V : X -t R U  {+m) be a nontrivial extended convex 
function defined on a finite dimensional vector-space X .  Then 
If moreover the function V is lower semicontinuous, then the inverse of the 
subdifferential aV(-)  is the subdifferential aV*(.) of the conjugate function: 
This result d o w s  us to  derive a subdifferential calculus form the calculus 
of conjugate functions, based on the following Fenchel Theorem. 
Since -V*(O) = infzEx V(z), the Fermat Rule becomes: 
Theorem 3.14 Let V : X I+ R u { + m )  be a nontrivial lower semicontinu- 
ous convex eztended function defined on a finite dimensional space X .  Then 
aV*(O) is the set of minimizers of V. 
As an example, we obtain 
Corollary 3.15 Let K C X be a closed convex subset. Then 
i )  ~ $ J K  (2) = {p E X* such that (p, z )  = SUPvE~ (p, y)) 
ii) a a ~ ( p )  = {z E K such that (p,z) = supvEK(p, y)) 
Definition 3.16 The first subset is the normal cone to K at z and the second 
one is called the support zone of  K at p. 
The negative polar cone of the normal cone NK(z) to a convex subset is 
called the tangent cone to K at z and is denoted by  
It can be easily characterized by: 
T K ( ~ )  = S K ( ~ )  
where 
The problem of finding an optimal allocation 




2 := (xi, ..., 2.) E ~ L ;  
i=l 
can be embedded in the problem of the form 
u := inf [V(x) + W(Ax)]. 
2 E  X 
where X := Yn, 
n n 
( x )  := ( x ) ,  W(y) := $ ~ ( y )  k Ax := E x ;  
i=l i=l 
which we shall now study in this simpler and more general framework. 
3.4 Fenchel's Theorem 
Suppose we have two finite dimensional vector-spaces X and Y, together 
with 
i) a continuous, linear operator A E L(X, Y) 
ii) two nontrivial, convex, lower semi-continuous functions 
V : X + R u { + w )  and W : X + R U { + W )  
We shall study the minimization problem 
u := inf [V(x) + W(Ax)]. 
2EX 
(3.7) 
Note that the function V + W o A which we propose to minimize is only 
nontrivial if A DomV n Dom W # 0, that is to say, if 
0 E A (Dom V) - Dom W. (3.8) 
In this case, we have u < +m. 
Now we introduce the dual minimization problem 
U* := inf [V*(-A*q) + W*(q)] 
qEY' 
(3.9) 
where A* E 
conjugate of 
makes sense 
L(Y*,X*) is the transpose of A, V* : X* + R U {+m) is the 
V and W* : Y* + R U {+m) is the conjugate of W. This only 
if we assume that 
0 E A* Dom W* + DomV* (3.10) 
and in this case, v* < +m. 
Note that we still have the inequality 
since, by virtue of Fenchel's inequality, 
V(z) + W(Az) + V*(-Aq) + W*(q) 2 (-A*q, z )  + (q, Az) = 0. 
Consequently, conditions (3;8) and (3.10) imply that v and v* are finite. 
Theorem 3.17 Suppose that A E L(X,Y) is a linear operator from X to 
Y and that V : X + R U {+oo) and W : Y + R U {+m) are nontrivial, 
convez, lower semi-continuous functions. We consider the case in which 0 E 
A (Dom V) - Dorn W and 0 E A* (Dom W*) + Dorn V* (which is equivalent 
to the assumption that v and v* are finite). 
If we suppose that 
0 E Int (A* Dorn W* + Dorn V*), 
then 
i) v + v * = O  
ii) 3 2 E X such that V(3) + W(A%) = v. (3.13) 
If we suppose that 
0 E Int (A Dom V - Dom W), (3.14) 
then 
i)  v + v * = O  
ii) 3 ij E Y* such that V*(-A*Q) + W*(ij) = v* (3.15) 
Proof - We introduce the map @ from Dom V x Dom W to  Y x R defined by 
together with 
i )  the vector (0, -v*) E Y x R 
ii) the cone Q = (0) x]O, c m [ ~  Y x R 
It is easy to show that the linearity of A and the convexity of the functions V and 
W imply that 
K := @(Dom V x Dom W) + Q is a convex subset of Y x R. (3.18) 
It is enough to prove that 
(0, -v*) E @(Dom V x Dom W) + Q. (3.19) 
because this inclusion implies the existence of a pair (Z, u) satisfying A 2  = jj and 
so that 2 is a solution to  our problem. 
Assume for the time that K is also closed. Then we infer that (0, -v*) E K. 
If not, the Separation Theorem implies the existence of a continuous linear form 
(p, a)  E X* x R such that 
sup rODomV [-a(V(2) + W(Y)) + (-P, A2 - Y)] + s ~ ~ e > o ( - a e )  
V Q D O ~ W  (3.20) 5 ((-p, -a),(O,-v*)) - E = av* - E 
Since the number ~ u p ~ > ~ ( - a e )  is bounded above, we deduce that it is zero and 
that a is positive or zero. We cannot have a = 0, since in that case, the inequality 
(3.20)ii) would imply the contradiction 
since 0 E A DomV - Dom W. 
Consequently, a is strictly positive. Dividing the inequality (3.20)ii) by a and 
taking fi = p la ,  we obtain 
E 
which implies the contradiction v* I v* - -. 
a 
It remains to prove that K is closed. For that purpose, we consider sequences 
z, E Dom(V) and y, E Dom(W) such that v, 2 V(z,)+ W(yn) converges to some 
v and z, := Az, - yn converges to some z. 
The idea is to deduce from assumption (3.12) that the sequence z, is bounded, 
because, in this case, it will remain in a compact subset and we will be able to 
extract a converging subsequence. 
So, by assumption, there exists v >  0 such that 
so that we can associate with any p E X* elements q E Dom(Wt)and r E Dom(V*) 
P 
such that 9- = A*q + r. 
Hence, 
llpll 
Therefore, a subsequence (again denoted by) z, converges to some z and y, := 
z, - Az, converges to z - Az. Since V and W are lower semicontinuous, we infer 
that 
V(z) + W(y) 6 v & z = Az - y 
which shows that the limit (z, v) belongs to K. 0 
Remark - This proof shows that the Fenchel Theorem remains true when 
X is a reflexive Banach space (suplied with the weak topology) and Y is a Banach 
space. Indeed, we proved that the convex set K is closed, i.e., weakly closed because 
1. the sequence z, is weakly bounded, and thus, weakly compact, so that a 
subsequence (again denoted by) z, converges weakly to some z 
2. every lower semicontinuous convex function is weakly lower semicontinuous. 
Actually, in finite dimensional vector-space, we do not really need to assume 
that the functions V and W are lower semicontinuous. 
Corollary 3.18 Let L C X and M c Y to closed conuez subsets and A E 
L ( X ,  Y )  a linear opemtor linked by the constraint qualification condition 
Then the normal cone to L fI A-'(M) 
and the tangent cone by 
Proof - Since $ L n A - i ( M ) ( ~ )  = $ L ( z )  + $M(Az) and since 
we deduce the formula for the normal cones. The one for tangent cones is 
obtained by polarity and transposition. 
Remark  - Without the constraint qualification condition, the above 
Corollary can be false. Take for instance X = Y := RZ, A = 1 and two 
balls L and M tangent at  a point z .  The tangent cone to the intersection 
{ z )  is reduced to {0), whereas the intersection of the tangent cones is a 
hyperplane. 
3.5 Properties of Conjugate Functions 
Firstly, we note the following elementary propositions. 
Proposition 3.19 a) If V < W ,  then W* 5 V*.  
6) If A E L(X, X )  is an isomorphism, then 
c )  If W ( z )  := V ( z  - zo) + (po,  z )  + a, then 
W*(P)  = V*(P - PO)  + ( p ,  20) - (a  + (po,  zo))  
d) If W ( z )  := V(Az) ,  then W8(p)  = V* ($1 and $ U ( z )  := XV(z), then 
Z 8 ( p )  = AV* (;) 
Proof - The first assertion is evident. The second assertion may be proved 
by showing that 
sup [(p, z )  - V(Az)] = sup [(A*-'p, Y) - V(Y)] = V* (A*-'P). 
=EX VEX 
For the third assertion, we observe that 
sup[(p,z)-W(z) l  = s u p [ ( p - p o , z ) - V ( z - ~ 0 3 1 - a  
=EX =EX 
= S ~ P [ ( P  -PO, Y) - V(YS1 - a + (P - PO, 20) 
zEX 
= V*(P - PO) + (P, 2 0 )  - a - (Po, 2 0 )  
Proposition 3.20 Suppose that X and Y are two finite dimensional vector- 
spaces and that V is a nontrivial, convex function from X x Y to RU {+m). 
Set W ( y )  := infzEx V ( x ,  y). Then 
Proof 
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that A E L ( X , Y )  is a linear operator and 
that V : X -t R U {+m) and W : Y -t R U {+m) are two nontrivial, lower 
semi-continuous functions. Suppose further that 
0 E Int ( A  Dom V - Dom W ) .  (3.23) 
Then, for all p E A* Dom W* + Dom V * ,  there exists q E Y* such that 
Proof - W e  may write 
sup[(p, x )  - V ( x )  - W ( A x ) ]  = - i n f [ V ( x )  - (p ,  x )  + W ( A x ) ]  
2 E X  
We apply Fenchel's theorem with V replaced by V(.) - (p ,  .), the domain of 
which coincides with that of V and the conjugate function of which is equal 
to  q + V*(q + p). Thus, there exists ij E Y* such that 
= inf [V*(p - A*q) + W*(q)] 
PEY 
It is useful to state the following consequence explicitly: 
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that A E L(X, Y) is a linear operator from X to 
Y and that 
W : Y + RU{+m) is a nontrivial, convex, lower semi-continuous function. 
We suppose further that 
Then, for all p E A* Dom W*, them exists q E Dom W* satisfying 
A*q = p and (W o A)*(p) = W*(q) = min W*(q) 
A*q=p 
Proof - We apply the previous proposition with V = 0, where the domain 
is the whole space X. Its conjugate function V* is defined by V*(p) = (0) 
if p = 0 and V*(p) = +m otherwise. Consequently, V*(p - A*q) is finite 
(and equal to  0) if and only if p = A*q. 
3.6 Subdifferential Calculus 
We can deduce easily from the calculus of conjugate functions a subdiffer- 
ential calculus. 
Theorem 3.21 W e  consider a linear operator A E L(X,Y) and two non- 
trivial, convex, lower semi-continuous functions V : X + R  U {+m) and 
W : Y + R u { + m ) .  
We assume further that 
0 E Int(A Dom V - Dom W). (3.26) 
Then, 
a ( v  + w o A)(x) = ~ v ( x )  + A * ~ W ( A X )  (3.27) 
Proof - It is easy t o  check that aV(z) + A*aW(Az) is always con- 
tained in a(V + W o A)(z). The inverse inclusion follows from Proposi- 
tion 3.4. We take p E (a(V + W o A)(z). There exists q E Y* such that  
(V + W o A)*(p) = V*(p - A*ij) + W*(q). Thus, from equation (3.24), 
Consequently, 
Since each of these two expressions is negative or zero, it follows that  
they are both zero, whence that c j  E aW(Az) and p - A*q E aV(z). Thus, 
we have shown that p = p -.A*q + A*q E aV(z) + A*BW(Az). 
Corollary 3.22 If V and W are two nontrivial, convez, lower semi-continuous 
functions from' X to R U {+oo) and if 
0 E Int (Dom V - Dom W) (3.28) 
then 
a ( v  + W)(Z) = a v ( ~ )  + a w ( ~ ) .  (3.29) 
If W is a nontrivial, convez, lower semi-continuous function from Y to 
R U {+m) and if A E L ( X ,  Y) satisfies 
then 
a ( w  0 A)(z) = A*aW(Az). 
Proposition 3.23 Let W be a nontrivial, convez function from X x Y to 
R U {+oo). Consider the function U : Y -t R U {+oo) defined by 
U(y) := inf W(z, y). (3.32) 
xEX 
If 5 E X satisfies U(y) = W(5, y), then the following conditions are equiva- 
lent: 
Proof - Since U*(q) = W*(O,q), following Proposition 3.20, we 
deduce that q belongs to i W ( y )  if and only if (q,  y) = U ( y )  + h*(q) = 
W ( 2 ,  y) + W*(O, q),  that is ,  if and only if (0,  q )  E a W ( Z ,  y). 
Proposition 3.24 We consider a family of convez functions z -+ V ( Z , ~ )  
indezed by a parameter p running over a set P .  We  assume that 
i)  P is compact 
i i )  Them ezists a neighborhood N of z such that, 
for all y in N ,  p -+ V ( Y , P )  is upper semi-continuous. (3.34) 
i i i )  Vp E P, y -+ V ( y , p )  is continuous at z .  
Consider the upper envelope U of the functions V ( . , p ) ,  defined by 
U ( Y )  = supp,p V ( Y ,  P) .  Set 
Then 




Proof - Since when p  belongs to  P ( z ) ,  we may write 
V ( z + h v , p ) - V ( z , p )  U ( t + h v ) - U ( z )  
h  l h  1 
letting h  tend to 0  we obtain 
We must establish the inverse inequality. Fix E > 0; we shall show that there exists 
p E P ( z )  such that DU(z ) (v )  - E 5 DV(z ,p) (v) .  Since the function U  is convex, 
we know that 
U  ( Z  + hv) - U (z) DU(z)(v)  = inf 
h>O h  
Then, for all h  > 0,  the set 
is non-empty. Consider the neighborhood Af mentioned in assumption (3.34)ii). 
There exists ho > 0 such that z + hv belongs t o  Af for all h 5 ho. Since p -+ 
V(z + hv,p) is upper semi-continuous, the set B h  is clased. On the other hand, if 
h l  5 h2, then Bh, C B h a ;  if p belongs t o  Bh, ,  the convexity of V with respect t o  
z implies tha t  
D U  (z)(v) - E 
5 li; [(I - k) ( ~ ( z ,  PI - ~ ( 2 ) )  + ~ ( v ( z  + hrv, PI - ~ ( z ) ) ]  
i;?;(V(z + hzv, P) - U(z)) 
since z + h l v  = hl  (1 - $) z + G(z  + h2v) and since V(z,  p) - U(z) < 0 for all p. 
Consequently, since P is compact, the intersection is non-empty and 
all elements p of this intersection satisfy 
h(DU(z)(v) - E) 5 V(z + h v , ~ )  -U(z). (3.40) 
Letting h tend t o  0,  we deduce tha t  V(z,p) - U(z) 2 0, whence p belongs t o  P ( z ) .  
Dividing by h > 0, we obtain the inequality 
Thus, i t  is sufficient t o  let E tend t o  0. 
Since y -+ V(y, p) is continuous a t  z ,  we know tha t  DV(z ,  p)(.) is continuous 
for each p ,  whence that  DU(z)(.) is lower semi-continuous. Equation (3.36) may 
be written as 
u(8U(z, v)) = sup u(8V(z, P), v) 
 PEP(^) 
which implies equation (3.37) D 
Corollary 3.25 Consider n convex functions V;: continuous at a point x. 
Then 
(3.41) 
where I (z )  = {i = 1,. . . , nlV,(x) = supj,~ ,...,  Vj(z)). 
3.7 Moreau-Yosida Approximations 
Consider a nontrivial, convex, lower semi-continuous function V from a 
Hilbert space X to R U {too) .  With any X > 0 we associate the func- 
tion VA defined by 
We shall show that the functions VA are convex, differentiable functions 
which are simply convergent to the function V as X tends to 0. This provides 
us with a regularization procedure which enables us to approximate V by a 
more regular function. 
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that V : X + RU{+oo) is a nontrivial, convex, 
lower semi-continuous function from a Hilbert space X to R U  {+oo}. There 
exists a unique solution (denoted by Jx(z)) of the problem vA(z): 
By applying it to the case where V = $K is the indicator function of a 
set K, we obtain the projection theorem, since in this case 
where d(z, K) := infyEK 112 - yJI is the distance from z to K. 
Proof 
Since the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality implies that 
1 X 1 
( ~ 7 2  - Y )  5 X I I X ~ I I  llz - yll 5 2 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 2  + G l l ~  - z112, 
this inequality implies that 
and thus that 
b) There exists a solution Z of the problem Vx(z). To prove this, we 
consider a minimising sequence of elements zn  E X satisfying 
We shall show that this is a Cauchy sequence. In fact, the so-called median 
formula implies that 
Consequently, we have 
since V is convex. 
Thus, zn converges to  an element 3 of X, since X is complete. 
The lower semi-continuity of V implies that 
5 Vx(.). 
Whence Vx(z) = V(3) + - z112. 
Since the Hilbertian norm is strictly convex, this solution is unique. 
The Fermat rule and the subdifferential calculus imply that 
which can be written 
We set: 
1 
Thus, Jx is the inverse of  the set-valued map 1 + XBV(.). The map Ax is 
called the Moreau-Yosida approximation of the subdifferential aV(.). 
We note that the maps Jx and 1 - Jx are both continuous, indeed Lips- 
chitz with constant 1. 
Proposition 3.26 The maps Jx and 1 - JA are Lipschitz with constant 1 
(independent of A )  and "monotone": 
i )  (Jxz- J A Y , ~ - Y ) ~ J J J A ~ -  J A Y I I ~  (3.45) 
i i )  ((1 - J A ) ~  - (1  - J A ) Y , ~  - Y) 1 1)(1- J A ) ~  - (1  - J A ) Y ~ ~ ~  
Proof - The variational inequality which characterizes JAz implies 
that  
Switching the roles of z and y, we have 
Adding these two inequalities, we find that 
The inequalities (3.45)i) and ii) follow from this inequality. 
This being so, we write 
Following (3.46), we deduce that  
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.27 Suppose that V : X -+ R U {+oo) is a nontrivial, con- 
vez, lower semi-continuous function. Then the functions VA are convez and 
differentiable and 
= V V A ( ~ )  (3.4 7) 
Moreover, when A tends to 0, 
Vz E DomV, Vx(z) + V(z) and Jxz + z (3.48) 
Proof 
a) For z belonging to the domain of V, we shall show that J A z  converges 
to z. We take any p in the domain of V* (which is non-empty). Since 
and since 
-V( J A ~ )  I V*(P) - (p, J A ~ )  
we deduce that 
(since ab < a2j'4X + b2X). Thus, since X converges to 0, 
I I J A ~  - zl12 I 4X(V(z) + V8(p) - (P, z )  + X((pl12) -+ 0 
b) Moreover, Vx(z) 5 V(z) + &J(z  - z1I2 = V(z). Since V(z) 5 
lim infx,0 V(JAz) (because V is lower semi-continuous) and since 
1 
~ ( J A z )  = V,(z) - XIIJAz - 2ll2 < V*(z), 
it follows that V(z) 5 liminfx,o V A ( ~ ) .  Thus, V(z) = limx,~ Vx(z). 
c) We observed that Ax(z) belongs to 8V(Jxz). Thus, 
X X 
VA(z) - V A ( ~ )  = V ( J A ~ )  -  JAY) + 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ( z ) l 1 2  - 5 ~ ~ ~ * ( ~ ) ~ ~ 2  
X X 2 ( A A ( ~ ) ,  J A ~  - JAY) + Z ~ I ~ ~ ( z ) l 1 2  - p ~ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ) ~ ~ 2  
(because Ax(z) E aV(Jxz)) 
(because Jx = 1 - AAx) 
Thus, we have shown that 
Moreover, since AA(y) belongs to aVx(y) for all y, we obtain the inequalities 
since JJAx(z) -AA(y)ll 5 i l lz  - yll (see Proposition 3.26, since Ax = i ( l  - 
Jr)). Thus, 
whence Ax(z) = VVA(z). 
Corollary 3.28 Let V : R U {+oo) be a nontrivial, convez lower semi- 
continuous function. Then V is subdiflerentiable on a dense subset of the 
domain of V. 
Proposition 3.29 Let Vd(z)) denote the element of aV(z)  with the small- 
est norm. We also have 
and for all z E Dom(aV), 
AA(z) converges to Vd(z)) when X + 04- 
Proof 
1. - Let z E Dom (aV). Then 
Using that  a V  is monotone, that  Vd(z)) E a V ( z )  and Ax(z) E aV(Jx(z)) ,  
we obtain 
Therefore, we have proved inequality 
IIAx(z) - vo'(z))I12 2 llVd(z))1I2 - llAx(z)1I2 (3.50) 
2. - We deduce that  y = Ax(z) is a solution t o  the equation y E 
a V ( z  - Xy). Indeed, setting z = z - Xy, this equation becomes z E z + 
XaV(z). Hence, 
This remark implies that  
Indeed, y = A,+A(z) is a solution to  the equation y E a V ( z  - Xy - py); then 
y E A,(z - Xy). Applying again the preceding remark to  the Yosida approx- 
imation A,, which is maximal monotone, we deduce that  y = (A,)x(z). 
3. - Now we use inequality (3.50), replacing a V  by A,. Since 
V,l,(z)) = A,(z), we obtain 
Then the sequence ( ~ A , ( Z ) ) ( ~  is monotone and bounded from above by (IV,l(z))1)2, 
so that  i t  converges t o  some real number a when X + O+. This implies that  
lim IIA,+x(z)-~,(z)11~ 5 a-a = 0 
x,,-+o 
Hence, Ax(z) satisfies the Cauchy criterion and converges to some element 
v in X. Since Ax(z) E OV(Jx(z)) and the graph of OV is closed, we deduce 
that v E OV(z). Also 
Since OV(z) is closed and convex, the projection of zero onto OV(z) is unique 
and consequently, v = Vi(z)). Therefore, Ax(z) converges to Vd(z)) for all 
z E Dom(OV). 0 
Remark - When X tends to infinity, we may interpret the minimisa- 
tion problem (3.42) as a penalization of the minimisation problem 
- V8(0) = inf V(z). 
ZEX 
(3.51) 
We observe that the Fenchel Theorem implies that 
that the minimisation problem Vx(z) has a solution denoted by J x z  and 
that its dual problem 
has also a solution dented by Ax(.). 
When X 4 oo, 
VA(z) tends to - V8(0) = inf V(z). 
zEX 
From Fenchel's Theorem, we know that 
In other words, we may write 
V.(.) + (V* - ~ ) ~ / , ( 0 )  = 0. (3.53) 
Consequently, when X 4 oo, (V* - X )~ ~ , (O )  tends to (V* - z)(O) = V*(O) = 
- inf,€x V(y) from the above. 
Assume that 0 belongs to the domain of OV* (in other words, if there 
exists a minimum of V). Since VVx(z) = Ax(z) is the unique solution of 
the problem (V* - then VVA(z) converges to  0 as X tends to  infinity. 
Consequently, if the limit of Jx(z )  as X tends to infinity exists, it belongs to 
OV8(0), in other words, it achieves the minimum of V. 0 
4 Subgradient Differential Inclusion 
We prove in this section the Existence Theorem 3.7 of a unique solution t o  
the Cauchy problem of a subgradient differential inclusion. 
For proving this theorem, we shall first approximate the lower semicon- 
tinuous convex function by its differentiable convex Moreau-Yosida approx- 
imation VA defined on the whole space and prove that  the solutions zx( . )  of 
the gradient equation 
z i ( t )  = -VVx(xx(t))  
converge t o  a solution t o  the subgradient differential inclusion (4.3). 
We first assume that a solution z(.) t o  the differential inclusion (4.3) 
exists and derive its properties. The solutions zA(.)  t o  the approximate 
gradient differential equation enjoy naturally the same properties, which 
shall be used in the proof of the convergence. 
Lemma 4.1 Assume that V : X H R U {+m) is nontrivial, convez, lower 
semicontinuous and bounded below. Let V - ( z ) )  denote the element of a V ( x )  
with the smallest norm. 
Let z ( - )  and y(.) be two solutions of the differential inclusion (4.3) start- 
ing at zo and yo respectively. Then 
Therefore, from any initial state zo E Dom(V) starts at most a unique 
solution to the differential inclusion (4.3) satisfying t H JJzl( t ) ( l  is not in- 
creasing. 
If z ,  achieves the minimum of V ,  then 
Proof - Let z ( . )  and y(.) be two solutions of the differential inclusion 
(4.3) starting a t  zo and yo respectively. The monotonicity property of the 
subdifferential implies that  
so that, by integrating this inequality, we obtain 
taking zo = yo, we infer the uniqueness of the solution. By taking 
z( t  + s) and y(t) := z(t  + s + h), which are solutions to (4.3) starting 
and z (s  + h) respectively, we deduce that 
Assume that z(-)  is differentiable a t  s and t + s. Then, dividing by h > 0 
and letting h converge to 0, we infer that 
so tat  the function t H IIzl(t)(( is not increasing. 
If z, achieves the minimum of V, then the Fermat rule implies that 
0 E aV(z,) and we deduce from the above inequality that 
Lemma 4.2 Assume that V : X H R U { t o o )  is nontrivial, convex, lower 
semicontinuous and bounded below. Then, for any initial state zo E Dom(V), 
there exists a unique solution to the differential inclusion 
for almost all t 2 0, zl(t) E -dV(z) (4.3) 
starting at zo. 
Proof - Let us consider the sequence of solutions zx(.) to the gradient 
equation z i ( t )  = -Vi(zx(t)) starting at  zo, which exist by the Cauchy- 
Lipschitz Theorem since Vi =: Ax is Lipschitz. 
Let us set 
We use now the relation XAx = 1 - Jx, the fact that AA(z) E aV(Jx(z))  
and the monotonicity property of aV(-). 
We note that . 
(AAx(zx(~)) ,  A P ( ~ P ( T ) ) )  5 A l l A x ( ~ x ( ~ ) ) ~ l  l lA,(z,(~))\ \  
5 I I A A ( ~ A ( T ) ) I I ~  + a I I A , ( ~ , ( . ) ) I I ~  
and, in the same way, that 
Therefore, we deduce from these remarks and from (4.5) that 
since 
IIAx(z(t))ll = Ilz'x(t)ll Ilzi(o)ll = IIAx(zo)ll 5 Ilvd(zo)ll 
Hence zx( . )  is a Cauchy sequence of the space C(0,l;  X), which thus 
converges uniformly to a continuous function z(- ) .  
The inequality 
implies that Jx(zx(t)) also converges uniformly to z(t). 
The sequence of derivatives z i ( . )  being bounded in L2(0, 1; X ) ,  a subse- 
quence converges weakly to z l ( - ) .  Inequalities 
and Fatou's Lemma imply by going to the limit 
Therefore, we deduce that 
V y E X ,  for almost all t > 0, V ( z ( t ) )  - V ( y )  < ( - z l ( t ) ,  z ( t )  - y )  
I.e., 
for almost all t 2 0,  - z l ( t )  E d v ( z ( t ) )  o 
Lemma 4.3 Assume that V : X H R U {too) is nontrivial, convez, lower 
semicontinuous and bounded below. Let V i ( z ) )  denote the element of d V ( z )  
with the smallest norm. Then the solution z ( - )  is slow in the sense that for 
almost any t ,  the norm of the velocity z l ( t )  is the smallest one: 
for almost all t 2 0,  z l ( t )  = -Vd(z(t)) 
Furthermore, t H V i ( z ( t ) )  is nonincreasing and continuous from the right 
and 
V t 2 0 ,  lim z ( t  t h )  - z ( t )  h = -Vd(z(t)) h-O+ 
Proof - We have seen that for t >_ 0,  
On the other hand, every weak cluster v ( t )  of the bounded sequence 
z i ( t )  E dV(Jx(zx) ( t ) )  belongs to -dV(z ( t ) ) .  Since Ilzi(t)ll 5 IIVL(zo)ll, we 
also deduce that the solutions are uniformly Lipschitz. 
On the other hand, since 
we infer that 
llv;(z(t))ll 5 llv(t)ll 5 l lV~(~(O))I l  
This implies that the function t w ((Vd(z(t))l( is not increasing. 
Let to be a point where z(-)  is differentiable. Since 
we infer that  
11 llvd(z(to))ll 
Since zl(to) E -aV(z(to)), we infer that zl(to) = -Vd(z(to)). 
Therefore, we deduce that for any t, the solution is differentiable from 
the right. Indeed, 
I t  is then sufficient t o  prove that that Vd(z(t)) is continuous from the 
right. Indeed, let us consider a sequence t, 2 t converging t o  t. Since 
1 1  Vd(z(tn)) 1 1  5 IIVL(z(t)) 11, a subsequence (again denoted by) Vd(z(t,)) con- 
verges weakly t o  some p. 
Inequalities 
imply that  p belongs t o  aV(z(t)). Hence 
Hence p = Vd(z(t)) is the weak limit of Vd(z(tn)) and IIVd(z(t))ll the limit 
of IlV,l(z(t,))ll. Therefore Vd(z(t)) is the strong limit of Vd(z(t,)). 
Therefore, equation 
implies that  the for every t 2 0, z(.) has a derivative from the right which 
is equal t o  -Vd(z(.)). 
Lemma 4.4 Assume that V : X w R U {+m) is nontrivial, convex, lower 
semicontinuous and bounded below. Then the solution z(-)  satisfies 
d for almost all t 2 0, -V(z(t)) + Jlz1(t)l12 = 0 dt 
Furthermore, if V is inf-compact, then x(t) converges when t -, oo to a 
limit x, which achieves the minimum of V: 
lim V(x(t)) = inf V(x) = V(x,) 
t--roo =EX 
Proof - Since x'(t) = -Vd(x(t)) is continuous from the right, in- 
equali ties 
V(z(t)) - V(z(t + h)) I ( -~ ' ( t ) ,  z(t) - x(t + h)) 
V(x(t + h)) - V(x(t)) I ( -~ ' ( t  + h), ~ ( t  + h) - x(t)) 
imply that 
d for almost ad t 2 0, -V(x(t)) + l l ~ ' ( t ) ( ( ~  = 0 dt 
This implies in particular that the function t w V(x(t)) is decreasing and 
thus, that i t  converges to  some a 2 - V*(O). 
Integrating this inequality from T to s, we deduce that 
so that, thanks to  the Cauchy criterion, we infer that 
This implies that for any E > 0, the measure of the set 
is infinite. Otherwise, its measure would be finite, so that the measure of 
R+\Tc would be infinite and 
which is impossible. So, for any E > 0, there exists one t 2 0 such that 
Ilx'(t)ll I E .  For such a t and for any x, achieving the minimum of V, we 
obtain 
by formula (4.1). By letting E converging to 0, we infer that 
inf V(x(t)) = inf V(y) 
i 20 VEX 
Since V is inf-compact and V(x(t)) 5 V(zo), the trajectory remains in a 
compact subset, so that there exists a cluster point x,, limit of a subsequence 
z(tn ). Therefore 
V(x,) 5 lim n+m inf V(x(tn)) = lim V(x(t)) = inf V(y) 
t+00 VEX 
5 Subgradient Algorithms 
We prove in this section Theorem 3.8 on the convergence of the subgradient 
algori t hm 
where pn E dV(xn) satisfy 
- - 
lim 6, = 0 & x 6 .  = +oo 
n--.m 
for convex finite functions defined on a finite dimensional vector-space X. 
We recall that we have assumed that 
-- 
lim 6, = 0 & 6, = +oo 
n+ca (5.1) 
We have to prove that the decreasing sequence of scalars 
ek := min V(xn) 
n=O, ..., k 
converges to the infimum v := infZEx V(z)  of V when k + oo. 
Proof of Theorem 3.8 - We prove this theorem by contradiction. If 
the conclusion is false, there exists T) > 0 such that u+29 5 81, 5 V(zt). Let 3 E X 
such that V(2) < u + T )  5 B t  - T). Hence 
We shall contradict this assumption by constructing a subsequence zn, such that 
lim,,, V(znh) 5 V(3). 
First, we observe that 
so that, by recalling that J J Z , + ~  -znll = 6, and that z n  - zn+l - Pn , we have 
6n IIpnII 
Let us set 
By the definition of the subdifferential and the choice of 5,  we deduce that 
so that crk > 0. By summing up the above inequalities from n = 0 to k, we obtain: 
On the other hand, we check easily that under assumption (5.1), 
c L O  6: converges to 0 
EL0 an 
Indeed, set ~k := ~ f ; = ~ & : ,  ~t := ~ i = ~ 6 ~  and K(E) the integer such that 
66 5 E whenever k 2 K(E). Then 
so that 
Since r k  -+ oo, we infer that 
Y k  lim sup - < E 
k - m  7t 
By letting E converge to 0, we have checked (5.3). 
Properties (5.2) and (5.3) imply 
lim crk = 0 
k - m  
Let nr. be the index such that 
Let us set 
We see a t  once that 
The first inequality implies that 
by the definition of the subdifferential. The second implies that there exists 1 > 0 
such that, for k 'large enough 
since a convex function defined on a finite dimensional vector-space is locally Lip- 
schitz on the interior of its domain. 
Therefore V(znk) 5 V(f) + la,, so that, passing to the limit, we obtain the 
contradiction lim,, V(znk) < V(Z) we were looking for. 
When V is a lower semicontinuous convex extended function, the sub- 
gradient algorithm makes no longer sense since we do not know whether 
Pn 
zn+l := zn - 6,- belongs t o  the domain of V. Hence the idea is t o  I I P ~ I I  
approximate V by its Moreau-Yosida approximation VA defined by 
and t o  use the gradient method for the Moreau-Yosida approximation. Hence, 
we have a sequence with two indices, the step of the approximation and the 
parameter A. 
Recall that VA is convex and differentiable. If JAz denotes the unique 
point which achieves the minimum of Vx, then 
1 V{(z) = Ax(z) := -(z - Jxz) E aV(Jxz) X 
Theorem 5.1 Let us consider the Moreau-Yosida appmzimations V A  o j  a 
nontrivial lower semicontinuous convex junction V : X w R U {+m) is 
bounded below. 
We  consider the regularized gradient method 
where 
X 1 pn := V { ( X ~ )  = -(z: - J X X ~ )  X 
Assume that 
m 
Then there ezists a subsequence o j  V x ( z i )  which converges to the infimum 
v := infZEx V ( z )  o j  V when k -r m and X w O+. 
Proof - We prove this theorem by contradiction. If the conclusion is 
false, there exist q > 0, N > O and p > 0 such that 
V n 2 N ,  V L p, v + 2q L V X ( ~ : )  
Let 5 E X such that V ( 5 )  < v + q 5 V x ( x i )  - q. Hence 
v n 2 N ,  V I p, V(5)  + q 5 V X ( Z ; )  (5 .5 )  
First, we observe that 
X X 
so that, by recalling that ~ I X : + ~  - x:II = lin and that 2: -xn+l _ - 
6n I I P ~ I I  1 We 
have 
I I X ~ + ~  - 5Il2 = llx: - 3112 - 21in (6, x: - 5 )  + 6; 
Let us set for any k 2 N 
Since VA(2) < V(3), we deduce that  from the definition of the subdifferential 
and the choice of Z that  
so that  a; > 0. By summing up the above inequalities from n = N to 
k > N ,  we obtain: 
On the other hand, we check easily that under assumption (5.1), 
C ~ = N  6; converges t o  0 C ~ = N  an 
Indeed, set 7 k  := ~ k = ~  6:, ~k := CiZN bn and K(E) the integer such 
that 6k 1 E whenever k 2 K(E). Then 
so that 
Since ~k + 00, we infer that 
7 k  limsup - 5 E 
k-20 Tk 
By letting E converge t o  0, we have checked (5.7). 
Properties (5.6) and (5.7) imply 
Let us take X := P k  and nk be the index such that  
Let us set 
We see at  once that 
( Y )  = (ff7.P) 
I - I  = ( - 3  = " k  ) pk 
The first inequality implies that 
by the definition of the subdifferential. 
We thus deduce from (5.5) that 
so that we obtain the contradiction 7 < 9 which converges to  0. 
6 Duality Theory 
6.1 The Duality Theorem 
We use the above subdifferential calculus for implementing the Fermat Rules 
and duality theory for the following general class of convex minimization 
problems: We consider 
1. two finite dimensional spaces X and Y; 
2. two nontrivial, convex, lower semi-continuous functions 
i )  V : X + R U { + o o }  
ii) W : Y + R U { + ~ ~ }  
iii) a continuous, linear operator A E L(X, Y) 
We shall choose elements y E Y and p E X* as parameters of the opti- 
mization problems 
v := inf ( V ( z )  - (p ,  z )  + W ( A z  + y ) )  
SEX (6.2) 
and 
v, := inf (V*(p  - A'q) + W * ( q )  - (9 ,  Y ) )  QEY* (6.3) 
which we shall solve at the same time. 
We shall say the minimization problems v and v, are dual. 
Theorem 6.1 a) We suppose that the conditions (6.1) are satisfied. If 
p E Int (Dom V *  + A* Dom w*), (6-4) 
then there ezists a solution Z of the problem v and 
v+v* = 0. 
b) If we suppose further that 
y E Int (Dom W - A Dom V )  
then the following conditions are equivalent 
i )  Z is a solution of the "primal" problem v 
i i )  Z is a solution of the inclusion p E BV(Z) + A*BW(AZ+ y). 
(6.7) 
c) Similarly, assumption (6.6) implies that there ezists a solution q of the 
dual problem v, and the two assumptions imply that the following conditions 
are equivalent: 
i )  q is a solution of the problem v, 
ii) q is a solution of the inclusion y E BW*(q) - ABV*(p - A'q). 
d) The two assumptions imply that the solutions Z and q of the problems v 
and v, are solutions of the system of inclusions 
i )  P E av(q + A*(T) 
i i )  y E -AZ + a w e @ ) .  
Remark - An optimal solution of the dual minimization problem v, is 
usually called a Lagmnge (or Kuhn-Tucker) multiplier, the inclusion (6.7)iii) 
is usually called the Euler-Lagmnge inclusion and the inclusion (6.l)iii) is 
the Euler-Lagmnge dual inclusion. The system of inclusions (6.8) is usually 
called the Hamiltonian system. 0 
The set-valued map (z,q) -+ (aV(z) + A*q) x (-Az + aW*(q)) from 
X x Y* to its dual X* x Y may be written symbolically in matrix form by 
The set of solutions (Z,ij) of the minimization problems v and v. may then 
be written in the suggestive form 
This notation highlights the variation of the set of solutions as a function of 
the parameters p E X* and y  E Y .  
Remark - When assumptions (6.4) and (6.6) of Theorem 6.1 are 
satisfied, solution of the problem v is equivalent to  solution of the inclusion 
(set-valued equation) 
p E aV(z) + A*aW(Az + y ) .  (6.10) 
Theorem 6.1 indicates another way of solving this problem. This involves 
first solving the inclusion 
and then choosing Z in the set 
This procedure is only sensible if the second inclusion is easier to solve 
than the first. This clearly depends on the functions V and W. If W is 
differentiable, it may be better to solve the inclusion (16). If, instead, V* is 
differentiable, it may be easier to solve the inclusion (17), which in this case 
may be written as 
AVV*(P - A*Q) + E aw*(q) (6.13) 
Remark: Gradient Methods - For solving the minimization prob- 
lem v (or v,), we can use the gradient method to either problem v or v,. 
We deduce from Theorem 3.7 the following result: 
Theorem 6.2 We posit the assumptions of Theorem 6.1. Then, for any 
initial state zo E Dom(V), there ezists a unique solution to the differential 
inclusion 
-z l ( t )  E a v ( z ( t ) )  + A * ~ w ( A z ( ~ ) )  
starting at zo; converging to an optimal solution f and satisfying 
lim ( V ( z ( t ) )  + W ( A z ( t ) ) )  = inf ( V ( z )  + W ( A z ) )  
t--roo sEX 
For any initial state qo E Dom(V), there ezists a unique solution to the 
differential inclusion 
starting at go, converging to a solution a of the dual problem and satisfying 
lim (W*(q( t ) )  + V*(-A*q(t))) = inf (W*(q)  + V*(-A*q)) 
t--roo qEY+ 
The discrete subgradient algorithms can be used when either the function 
V + W o A or V *  o (-A*) + W *  are finite and continuous. In this case. they 
yield 
I Pn zn+l - 2, E -6,- where IIpnll 
Otherwise, we have to take their Moreau-Yosida approximations. 
6.2 Minimization Problems with Constraints 
Let us consider 
i) two finite dimensional spaces X and Y, 
ii) a continuous, Linear operator A E L(X, Y), 
iii) a convex, closed subset M C Y, 
iv) a nontrivial, convex, lower semi-continuous function V : X -, R U  {+oo) 
and two elements y E Y and p E X*. 
We consider the minimization problem 
v := inf (V(z) - (p, 2)) 
AtEM-y  
with its associated dual problem 
v, := inf*(V*(p - A'q) + UM(Q) - (9,  Y)). (6.16) 
q€y 
Corollary 6.3 If we suppose that 
p E Int (Dom V* + A * D o ~ ( ~ M ) )  (6.17) 
then there ezists a solution Z (satisfying AT E M - y) of the problem v. If 
we suppose further that 
then the solutions Z of the pmblem v are the solutions of the inclusion 
The following conditions are then equivalent: 
i) q is a solution of the inclusion y E auM(q) - AaVf(p - A'q). 
ii) The optimal solutions Z and q of the problems v and v, are related by 
p E aV(Z) + A'q and q E NM(AZ + y). (6.20) 
The minimization problem 
v := inf (V(z) - (p, z ) )  At+y=O (6.21) 
which is a minimization problem with 'constraints of equality' is obtained 
as the particular case in which M = (0). Its dual problem is 
v, := inf.(V*(p - A'q) - (q, y)). (6.22) 
q€Y 
Corollary 6.4 If we suppose that 
p E Int (Dom V *  + Im A*) 
then there ezists a solution Z of the problem v. 
If we suppose further that 
- y E Int ( A  Dom V )  (6.24) 
then the solutions Z of the problem v are the solutions of the inclusion 
The following conditions are equivalent 
i)  ?j is a solution of the problem v,; 
ii) q is a solution of the inclusion y E -AaV*(p - A*$. (34) 
The optimal solutions Z and of the problems v and v, are related by 
Suppose that P C Y is a convex, closed cone and denote its negative 
polar cone by P-. The cone P defines an order relation 2 by 
yl 1 y2 if and only if yl - y2 E P (6.27) 
and the cone P- defines the order relation 
qi 5 9 2  if and only if ql - q2 E P-. (6.28) 
The minimization problem 
v := inf ( V ( z )  - (p, z ) )  
Ax+yZO 
which is a minimization problem with 9nequality constraints" is obtained 
in the special case in which M = P. Its dual problem is 
v+ := inf (V*(p  - Aq) - (q,  y ) ) .  
P E P -  
Corollary 6.5 If we suppose that 
p E Int (Dom V *  + A* P-) (6.31) 
then there exists a solution I of the problem v. 
If we suppose further that 
then the solutions f of the problem v are the solutions of the inclusion 
The following conditions are equivalent 
i )  q is a solution of v, 
ii) i j  is a solution of the inclusion y E Np-(ij) - ABV*(p - A'q). 
The solutions f and q of the problems v and v, are related by 
i )  p E W ( f )  - A*q 
ii) A f  + y 2 0,  i j  5 0 and (q, AT + y )  = 0. (6.34) 
6.3 Optimal Allocations 
We shall denote by 
B;(q, r )  := { z  E Dom(K) I (q, x )  I r )  
the budget set of  consumer i and by 
her demand set. The demand map is the set-valued map (q,  r )  - D;(q, r ) .  
We observe that 
V Ti E a(V,*)(-q), Di(q, ( q , X ) )  := S ( q )  = a(V,*)(-9) 
Indeed, t o  say that x; E a ( T ) ( - q )  amounts to  saying that 
o E aVi(xi) + q 
or, equivalently, that 
V Y E Y, K ( z i )  + (9, xi) i K ( z )  + (9, z )  
This can be written 
(&(xi) - V;(x)) I (9, x - xi) 
We define Change maps C; : L; x S1 .u Y by: 
On the other hand, we observe that the supply map associating with any 
q E Y* the subset SM(q) C M defined by 
is equal to  the support zone of M: 
so that 
y E SM(q) if and only if q € NM(Y) 
We observe that assumption 
implies that 
V Y E M ,  NM(Y) C R!+ 
because for any price q E NM(y), we have 
so that q can only ne nonnegative. Furthermore, if M is bounded above, we 
infer that 
D O ~ ( U M )  3 R!+ 
because, for any nonnegative price q E R:, 
Hence assumption (2.2): 
i) M = M - R: is a closed convex subset 
ii) M c ~ - R :  - 
implies that 
Dom(uM) = R: 
Assumption (2.3): 
states that the negative cone Rf_ is contained in the domain of each v. 
Since the conjugate function of 
is the function defined by 
we see that 
n 
Dom(V*) = D o m ( v )  = R! 
i= 1 
We take for operator A the sum: 
n 
the transpose of which is equal to 
Therefore, property 
is satisfied because Dom(V*) + A*Dom(W*) = R'_" + A*R$ = R'". 
Theorem 6.6 Let us assume the set M of scarce resources is closed and 
convez and satisfies assumption (2.8) and that the loss functions V, : Y H 
Ru{+w) are nontrivial, convez and lower semicontinuous and satisfy (2.8). 
Assume furthermore that 
Then there ezists an optimal allocation c E Dom(K) and a price q E Y* 
which are solutions to the optimal allocation problem 
v := inf E x ( % )  
zEK i=l 
where 
and to its dual pmblem 
The following conditions are equivalent: 
a )  the price and the allocation ( f  l , .  . . ,Zn) satisfy 
. -. 
each 5, belongs to consumer i's demand set 
n 
i i )  C T i  E SM(I) 
i.e., C f i  maximizes the available income (ij, y) 
b) the optimal price ij clears the market in the sense when it is a solution 
to the inclusion 
n 
0 E  OM (ij) - Bi(q) 
i=l 
n 
stating that the supply 8aM(q)  is balanced by the total demand x z,(q). c) 
the price i j  and the allocation ( T I ,  . . . ,En) satisfy 
i )  V i = l ,  ..., n, 0 E Ci(Ti,q) 
each Z; is an equilibrium of the consumer i's change map 
i i )  i j  E NN Z E ;  
By taking V;. := we deduce the following characterization of the 
tangent and normd cones to the sets of docations 
Corollary 6.7 Assume that the Resoume Set and the Consumption Sets 
are closed and convez and satisfy 
0 E Int Z L ~ -  M C:, 1 
Then 
and 
( P  + 91 3 . .  ,P + R )  where qi E NL,(z )  6i p E NM 
Proposition 6.8 We posit the assumptions of Theorem 6.6. Then ij is a 
solution of the dual problem if and only if it belongs to the subdifferential 
8 v ( y )  of the marginal function v defined by 
v ( y )  := inf xV;.(q) 
"EK(sr) ;=1 
where 
Proof - The marginal function v can be written v ( y )  = infu(z,v) 
where 
n / n \ 
By Proposition 3.23, we know that j j  E a v ( 0 )  if and only if (0, i j )  belongs t o  
aU(E, 0 )  since v ( 0 )  = U(Z,  0 ) .  The latter inclusion can be written 
- V i = 1 ,..., n, 0 E a K ( E ) +  N M ( ~ : = ~  t i )  
Therefore, i j  is the solution to the dual problem. 
We know that the differential inclusions 
and 
n 
( '~(9)  + x v ( - q )  
i=l 
have unique solutions converging to solutions of the optimal allocation prob- 
lem and its dual respectively. Under the assumption of Theorem 6.6, the 
first differential inclusion can be written in the form 
V i = 1 , .  . . , n, t : ( t )  E -aV , ( t ; ( t ) )  - q ( t )  =: C i ( t ; ( t ) ,  q ( t ) )  [ where 
and the second one in the form 
This proves Theorems 2.2 and2.3. 
Remark - We can also derive from the duality a third system of 
diferential inclusions of a Hamiltonian flavor 
i)  -zl(t) E a ( E L I  K(z;(t))) + q(t) 
ii) -ql(t) E  a u ~ ( q )  -Cr=L=, z;(t)
This an algorithm of the form of a dynamical system proposed by S. Smale 
in [150], which unfortunately shares with the tiitonnement process the flaw 
of not being necessarily viable. 0 
7 Calculus of Tangent Cones 
It may be useful to recall the characterization of the interior of the tangent 
cone to a convex subset. 
Proposition 7.1 (Interior of a Tangent Cone) Assume that 
the interior of K C X is not empty. Then 
Furthermore, the gmph of the set-valued map K 3 z ?.t I n t ( T ~ ( z ) )  is open. 
For the convenience of the reader, we list in the Table 1 some useful 
formulas of the calculus of tangent cones to convex subsets which will be 
proved later, in which the subsets K ,  K;, L, M, ... are assumed to be 
convex.) 
We shall need the following characterization of the normal cone to  a 
convex cone: 
Lemma 7.2 Let K c X be a conuez cone of a normed space X and z E K. 
Then 
where NK-(p) := {z E K I V ~ E  K-, < q - p , z  > 5 0). 
Proof - To say that p E  NK(z) means that < p, z >= UK(P), which 
is equal to 0 if and only if p E  K-, and the first statement of the lemma 
follows. 
Table 1: Properties of Tangent Cones to  Convex Sets. 
(1) b I f z ~ K c L c X , t h e n  
T K ( ~ )  C T L ( ~ )  & N L ( ~ )  C N K ( ~ )  
(3) b I fz ;EK;CX; ,  ( i= l , . - . , n ) , t hen  
Tnk1 Ki(zi,.. ,zn)  = nL1 TK,(zi) 
Nn:=l Ki(z1,...,2n) = n?=lN~, (z i )  
(4)a) b If A E L(X, Y) and z E K c X, then 
TA(K)(Az) = A(TK(~)) 
NA(K)(A~) = A*-' NK(Z) 
(43b) b If K1, K2 C X,  z; E Ki, i = 1,2, then 
T K ~ + K ~ ( ~ I  + 22) = T K ~ ( ~ I )  + T ~ ~ ( 2 2 )  
N K ~ + K ~  (21 + ~ 2 )  = N K ~  (21) fl N ~ ~ ( z 2 )  
In particular, if x1 E K and 2 2  belongs to 
a closed subspace P of X, then 
TK+P(~I  + 22) = TK~(ZI) + P 
NK+P(~I  +z2) = NK(ZI) n P'
(5) b If L C X and M C Y are closed convex subsets and 
A E L(X,Y) satisfies the 
constraint qualification assumption 
0 E Int(M - A(L)), then, for every z E L n A-'(M), 
TLnA-1(~) = TL(z) n k1TM(A2) 
NL~A-I(M) = N L ( ~ )  + A*NM(A~) 
(5)a) b If M C Y is closed convez and if A E L(X, Y) 
satisfies 0 E Int(Im(A) - M), 
then, for any z E A-'(M), 
TA-i(M)(~) = A-lTM(Az) 
NA-l(M)(~) = A*NM(Az) 
(5)b) b If K1, K2 C X are closed convex and satisfy 
0 E Int(K1 - Kz), then, for any z E K1 n K2 
TKlnK2(2) = TK1 (z) fl TK~(z) 
NK1nK2 (z) = N K ~  (2) + NK2 (z) 
(5)c) b If K; C X, ( i  = 1,. . . , n), are closed and convex, 
z E Ki and if there exists y > 0 satisfying 
Vzi such that 11z;11 5 y, nr=l(K; - 2;) # 0, then 
Tnkl ('1 = an=' TKi ('1 
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